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Dean Curtis Resigns; Joins Hastings Law Faculty 
Stephen R. Curtis 
by Tom Foley 
tephen R. Curti~. Dean of the William ::\fitehell College of Law. 
IVill leaYe his position thi um.mer to join the faculty of the HaMg· 
College of lhe Law. San F raueisco, California, wl1er he will a1-rry a full 
teachin,a load. D ean Curti 71 wa invited to teach at Hastings in 
1961, but cl :cl.in d al lhat time iu order to further th progrmn becrun 
at 'William ii tchell. 
Compri ed of law pr fessor" o,·er 65. the H a ting · faculty presenLly 
includes such notewortJH' name- a Everett ,Fraser. forruer dean of the 
Univer ity of )Iiunesot~ Law •· hool. and William L . P ro ser. former 
prof r .a.t the University of ::.\1.iru.ur ta and recently clean of the ·uj-
ver·i ty or alifornia Law cbool. Ha. ting~ i Lh • olde· t and aLo the 
larg day law chool on the P acific oa t, bavin an nrollment of 
over 9,5 full-time stude.n~-. 
D -ea.t1 Curt.i · take· with h.iin a wealtl1 of experience in both the a.c.i-
de:mic and administrativ u. peel· of teaching Jaw. Br. gi·aduated from 
the ·mversit~· of hicago L aw "chool and practicer! Ju.w jn that city for 
many year-. .Fo1· £.fteen vea s b taugh t at J ohn Marball La,w 'chool 
on a part-time b i· . In 1949, D ean urti· · urned full-time duties a · 
a- ·, tant dean and profe or of law at Johll • Iarsha]L L ater. h went 
to Ohio Northern University as dean. 
·nc-e 19.58. Dean Curtis ha- been at William. l\Ii tchell as dean aud 
profe or oI law. For two year p rior to that date, two di vi~ion of 
William M itchell bad ·been operating sepa.rately under D ean Johll A. 
Burn . Then_ in I958 th e two divi ·ion one in )1:inneaipoli and the 
other in ' t. Pa ul, wa:emo ·ed to tl1e new buildin . Among th fir t tasks 
facincr the school adm.inistrato!'s was th consolidation o{ the wo teachin 
staff , two student bodie , and t wo para te curricul um into ne. 
In Lhe period since 195 William ),Jj t hell ha , een th eiq an ion 
of work in the field of P rof ioual Re po'nSibility and in afoot Court. 
New cour haYe been added in Antitrust Law, omparati,·e Law 
Legal Accountin"', Legal D raftrng, Legal Writing, and Taxation of Trusts 
and E ta e . Dean urtis f el t.hat ffilli am Mitchell presently po--
e :- • a trong faculty at1d sound cuniculum, and has attained a ao cl 
:taniling in. the community and ·11.te. particulaa·l~r amonu member of 
the legal profession. till he feel that althou.,h it i an out blnc)jng ve-
niu.:r law chool , it has no yet reached it· peak in excellence. 
Teaching ha alway been a primary in ter st to D ean n.rti ·, as i · 
evidenced by his background. And while lie also .finds administration 
both stim ulating and enjoyable, be recognizes it, pressure . Thi- !acto.r 
m1doubtedJ~, inft11euced the Dean to accept the Ra•ting iovitation 
when it was offered a ,second time. 
William Mitchell Published by the 
Student Bar Association 
Pl William Mitchell College of Law 




Judge Burger to Address Grads; 
·Mitchell Portrait to Be Dedicated 
Andrew N. Johnson, !>resident 
of tbe William Mitchell College 
of Law Board of Trustees, an• 
nounced last week the appoint-
ment of Douglas R. Heidenreich 
as Acting Dean of the College. 
Heidenreich is presently Assis• 
tant Dean and instructor in the 
Introduction to Law and Sales 
courses. 
The appointment is scheduled 
to take effect on August 1st and 
will coincide with the effective 
date of the resignation of Dean 
Curtis, who will leave on that 
date to assume his position at 
Hastings College of the Law. 
Heidenreich holds a B.A. de-
gree from the University of 
Minnesota. He is a 1961 magna 
cum laude graduate of William 
Mitchell, ranking first in his 
class. From 1961 to 1963 he 
was associated with the Min• 
neopolis low firm of Erickson, 
Popham, Haik and Schnobrich. 
He was appointed Assistant 
Dean and Assistant Professor 
in Morch of 1963. 
$9448 Granted 
by Carolyn Meyer 
The Honorable ·warren E . Burger, 
of the Washington, D.C . Circuit 
Court of Appeals, will be the speak-
er a t the 1964 William ~Iitchell 
commencement to be held at 8: 00 
P.M. on June 9. At that time, Judge 
Burger will be awarded an honorary 
Doctor of Law degree by the B oard 
of Trustees of William Mitchell. 
Seventy-two seniors are scheduled 
to receive Bachelor of Laws degrees 
at the College of St. Thomas Ar-
mory, the site of the commencement 
exercises. 
Also during the ceremony a por-
trait of former 1Iinne- ta upre ~e 
Court J u tice William Thtchel for 
whom the college \,·a- Jli1m , will 
be presented to the school ·by mem-
bers of the Mitchell family. The 
portrait will be placed on disp1ay 
in the law school. 
Judge Burger, a na tive of St. 
Paul, attended the University of 
Minnesota and the St. Paul College 
of Law where he was graduated of t. he Civil Division handling the I 
magna. cvm /.cnule in. 1981 with n government's civil litigation in all 
degree of LL.B. :Se also received · t:he ,federal court,s a.nd .special courts 
the l'hi Beta Gamma, · ward for in the federal system. 
· cholarship. In 1931 he became a In 1954 Judge Burger served as 
meinb r of the faculty of the law a member and legal ,adviser to the 
college, first teaching Contra cts and United States delegation to the In-
later teaching Trusts. ternational Labor Conference at 
Upon admission to the Minne- Geneva. Re ·has written ,articles for 
sota bar ,he became a ssociated with various law journals, chiefly on sub-
the firm of Boyesen, Otis, Brill & je , relatinu to judicial admini tra-
Fa.ricy. In 1935 he became a part- tion , public d fender problem and 
ner of the firm and continued to post.,crraduate legal ducat.ion. and is 
practice in St. Paul until 1953. acti ,·e in the work of th In, itute 
Included in his Minnesota public of Judicial Administration. He is 
activities were member,ship in the a member of the American Bar As-
Governor's Emergency War La:bor sociation, :Minnesota Bar Associa-
Board, the Governor's Interracial tion, Federal Bar Association, Inter-
Commission, and the CounciI of Hu- national Bar Association , Inter-
man Relations, of which he was American Bar As soci,ation, the 
president. He has also been a trustee American Society of International 
of Macalester College, and of the Law and the American JudicatUTe 
governing board of the Mayo Foun- Society. 
dation. Judge Burger resigned as Assist-
In 1953 he was appointed As- ant Attorney General early in 1955 
sistant Attorney General by Presi- to return to his law firm in St. Paul 
dent Eisenhower and ,served as head and shortly thereafter was appointed 
to the Court of Appeals. His con-
tacts with law schools have been 
resumed since his appointment to 
Scholarsh~ps Go to 24 Students 
the bench, and he has lectured at 
Duke University Law School, New 
York University Law School, Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania Law School, 
American University Law School, 
and at The Hague Academy ·of In-
ternational Law in Holland. Since 
then the Judge has taken post-
graduate work at New Yor.k ni-
ver it:y and has attended a · umm r 
by Lee L. Fossum 
Total funds granted to student ,as cholarship for 
the 1963-64 school vear were ~ 9 4.'18.00 increased from 
,'6,750.00 last ~·ea:r. The faculty scholarship committee, 
meeting in J iumary, elected the twenty-four recipients 
from a.piplication ubmitted from all four classes. The 
teady growth in scholarship fund contributed ,by 
intere5ted donor i- -a gratifyin-" demonstration of 
public intere in William :Mitchell CoII ge and the 
le,,"'lll profession . .Amo:ng the donor listed al:'e: tl1e Otto 
Brem r F oun<lation, Edward I . Cudahv F oundation. 
) fargaret H. and J ames E. Kelley Foundation, :P. W. 
kogmo Foundation, :Minne ota Late Bar Foundation , 
'tudent Bar Association, Lawyer-' Wims of R am s 
County William l\1i tchell Law Wive , Farmer Insur-
ance Group, and nume.rous Jaw :firm and corpora tions. 
All eholfil' hip:- are awarded on th basis of la.w 
hool scholastic :performance and nnancial need. These 
criteria are applied without aip])Ortioning any specific 
number of scholarcShips to each cla.s" al though some 
de,,crree of preference i given to students ·above the 
fi rst ~'e.a:r. Amounhs granted va.ry fro;m ·a.bout 100 to 
$600, on an individuaJ b i as to need or specified 
by the donor. 
Students interested in applying for schol,ar,ships for 
the next -year ar encouraged to file applications with 
the admini~tration office a,t any time prior to October 
1964. It is hoped toot th hola.rship program will be 
supplemented with a student loan tund. possi·bly next 
fall . 
11he following students received scholarships this 
year: 
Walter Anastas, Richard D. Arvold, John E. Brandt, 
Robert F. Collins, Alan W. Falconer, Joseph E . Flynn, 
J r., ha.rles R . Hall, R obert E. Ha.Int., Floyd A. HiTI-
strom. R odne,· M. H_yn , Ronald F. J ohmou, Fred-
erick W. Xei er, George M . Kimball . R iclw:rd H. Kn1Jt-
on T homas R. Lay, J am . Lane Ill, llichard J . 
Langlai . Louis W. Larson, Rober E . Mathia.-; Thom-
a J. J\lcLeod 3.Ila,n E . 1 ![ulligan, Ricb.a..rd F. _ "itz 
Gary L. Phleger, and Robert W. Rahn. 
ession at T he H.:igue .\ caclemy of 
International Law. 
Potential candidates for degrees 
this June are: 
Walter Anasta,s, Richard D . Ar-
vold, Walter M. Baker, Charles F. 
Bisanz, Arthur F. Blaufuss, Glenn 
W . Bones, Arthur H. Braun, John 
0. Brunelle, Joseph M. Buchmeier, 
W.iI1iam B. Christensen, Neil P. 
Convery, Eugene J. Crosby, Rex J . 
David, Jr., Robert C . DeVeau, 
Robert W. Doyle, Robert T. Edell, 
Peter S. Ekholm, Ronald R. Frauen-
shuh, James D. Gibbs, Robert D. 
Grashuis, James R. Hall, Wayne A. 
Hon. Warren E. Burger 
Rergott, Arthur J . Heuer, Dennis J. 
Rolisak, Rodney M. Hynes, James 
B. Jenkins, John R. Kelley, William 
R. K:resl, Paul A. Kyyhkyynen, Al-
lan W. Lamkin, Davi<l P. Langevin, 
Richard J. Langlais, Donakl L. 
Larson, Loui,s W. Larson, Patrick 
J. Leary, John M. Leibel, Peter 
Lopez, Jr. 
Ronald J. McGraw, Edward N. 
Mansur, Daniel J. Meaney, Jr., 
Kenneth A. Mitchell, Thomas M. 
Mooney, Carl D. Nelson, William J. 
New,power, Richard F. Nitz, David 
B. Orfield, Eugene A. Parsons, Don-
ald G. Paterick, Warren E. Peter-
son, Michael J . Pisansky, Salva.tor 
Primoli, Ronald T. Reiling, Joseph 
H. Rivard, Kenneth J. Rohleder, 
Robert L . San<lberg, Roger G. 
Scherer, John A. Studer, Lawrence 
R . Sullivan, John D. Tierney, Mi-
chael C. Tierney, James R. Tschida, 
Celestine E. Von Feldt, John E. 
Walsh, John J. Waters, Orville L. 
Weiszh:aar, Paul A. Welter, John J. 
W eyrens, Perry L . Williams, Joseph 
D. Zwak. 
1964 graduates who completed 
their studies in J.anuary are Paul L. 
Ballard, Gerald G. Dederick, and 
Donald F. Giblin. 
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EDITORIALS 
John B. Sanborn 
Marc Antony protested that men\s aahievements often disappeared with 
their bones. Lest that be the .f.ate of John Sanborn, we must ·speak of him 
here. 
Man has always struggled that hi_., stamp, his mark, mrghrt somehow 
survive his flesh. Most of us are limited in this attempt. We produce our 
sons and daughters, hut our imprint upon them i-s soon clouded by their 
own personalities. Others leave fortunes, ibut one Troosury note look<S 
pretty muah ·the same 3JS another. The law, however, operates ,so that a 
judge's life is recorded forever. 
1\fost men obe •l'.!he law· ome men know the law-. But John Sanborn 
wrot the law, and in that venb lies the met.hod of his immorta.l:ity. Our 
doctrine of stare deaisis create. a taggering responsibility upon 1.he appel-
late judge. Each choice of word each tum of phro.se must be chosen with 
great r egard to its ipemnanence. EacL case decided i of rpotentially enor-
mous effect upon tben unknmvn l itigation. Former Su t ice Whittaker' 
tribute to J udge Sanborn, publi.s:becl on -page even of thi: issue, ·SU"g ts 
the quality of this heri-tage. 
Judge Sanborn' bond to William Mite.hell was strong and deep. A 
pre iderrt and trustee he nurtured much. of iibe integrity which this institu-
tion now enjo) . Without doubt, his contributions of r,are books and 
appellate briefs will long survive as tangible evidence of hi · solicitude for 
the college. A in oo many in tanees, however, hi grea.te t contributions 
to tudents. to the law and to ociety are in-tangible. Hi legal perception. 
i '])reserved in his opinions; his character i ,pre erved in this in.-stitution. 
His mark is truly indelible. 
John Benjamin Sanborn, R.I.P. A. E. M . 
The Indigent 
There has been a irrea,t insurgence of interest in the indigent since the 
decision by t:he upreme onrt in Gi.deon v. 1T ainwright, 87° U .. 385 
(196'3) . Gideon a prisoner and unaible to afford counsel. wrote a letter to 
the "rupreme Oourt 'Vhicli led to a retrial with comipetent defense counsel 
and his subsequent freedom. Had Jie not w-i·itten the letter &nd .had the 
upreme ow·t not reviewed hi crud petition, he would till be in jail 
toda)' . AJ o had he b en. able to afFord competent -defen._<:e coun el .from the 
onset of the --proceeding'. his impri, orlilJ.ent (or freedom) would not have 
re tc<l on uch a tliread of chance. 
The defense of indigents must not •be overlooked or cast afilde. The most 
widely itccepted means of combating the problem are (1) a.ssigned coun.."el 
n.nd ('2) organized defender ystems. H o\,·ever. eit11er -~, em gi"'es Ti e to 
such issues ,as the cope of legal obligation lo -pi;ovi.de coun el, when counsel 
should be provided the avail-ability of defense lawyer , the obtaining of 
funds to support the systcnr, and :etting publ.ic su'J)'port. Thes a.r but a 
few of the factors that must b eon~itlered . The actual system to be em-
ployed as the -solution wi11 obviously not be eaisily determined, but never-
theless, a solution must be found. 
Merely ·because the .solution is not easily d etermined cannot be ground,s 
for non-action. The law is, by necessity, an organized system of jurispru-
dence by which society governs itself. It progresses as society progresses. 
This principle enables us to maintain a fair -and oi,derly system of adminis-
tering justice. D.W.S. 
Better Public Image of Night Law 
Schools Sought by SBA President 
by Dick Langlais 
The hackneyed expression "a man 
is known by the company he keeps" 
has ,si·gni:6.cant application to a law 
student. We generally surmise that 
most eastern law school graduates 
have less difficulty in obtaining rea-
sonably remunerative positions upon 
graduation than do mid-western 
1aw students, and still less difficulty 
than an evening law student from 
any area. A significant portion of 
the pu:blic, not to mention the Bench 
and the Bar, somehow feel that a 
legal education from an evening law 
school is to be considered as less 
meritorious than a similar education 
from a day 1aw school. Evening law 
schools are frequently characterized 
as non-professional, profit-making 
trade schools. These erroneous opin-
ions of evening law schools neces-
sarily result in like erroneous opin-
ions of the students and graduates 
from these schools. 
Unfortunately these opinions, at 
least to some degree, are due to the 
failure of the evening schools them-
selves to present an image to the 
public that accurately portrays the 
true character and purpose of eve-
ning la,w schools. 
At the American Law Student 
Association Convention in Chicago 
last August, I was privileged to 
meet students from many evening 
law schools, almost all of whom ex-
pressed the belief that such opinions 
are all too prevalent. Out of con-
cern for ,the problem, it was pro-
posed -that an Evening Law School 
Committee of ALSA be formed for 
the purpose of studying the opera-
tions and rproblems of evening law 
schools, particularly with reference 
to forming a more favorable and 
accurate public image of such 
schools. 
This committee has now been 
formed, and its activities begun. 
William Mitchell has been requested 
-to ,participate, and I am sure that 
we will all help in whatever way 
we can. 
One task to be undertaken has 
been delegated to a sub-committee, 
whose job it will be to apprise the 
public of the real character of an 
evening law school, and the gener-
ally excellent attributes and capa-
bilities of its ·students upon gradua-
tion. Once the true facts are in the 
open, this job should be relatively 
easy. 
Certainly one of these facts, well 
known to anyone who has ever gone 
through the long years in an evening 
school, is that such a student is 
generally more desirous than his 
counter,part in day school of obtain-
ing a legal education. Unquestion-
ably, the route for an evening stu-
dent is more difficult, more demand-
ing, and more concentrated. It soon 
discourag-es any student who may 
tend to be apathetic, indifferent, or 
interested solely in ,the social climate 
of a professional school. 
Furthermore, the evening law stu-
dent necessarily learns early how to 
Langlais 
program his time to 
meet the arduous 
requirements of 
p:repari n ,g for his 
classes, while a t t he 
same time trying to 
improve the skills 
demanded of ihim 
in his regular em-
ployment. This 
knowled-ge of the 
economics of time will later prove 
very fruitful in developing a suc-
cessful law practice. 
An evening law graduate is gen-
erally more mature than his day 
school brethren because of his age 
and his corresponding advanced ex-
penience and responsibility in the 
domestic, business, and professional 
worlds. Upon graduation, he is 
probably SO years of age, married, 
and has four or more years of active 
participation in a related legal field, 
or in a field which will ibe of sub-
stantial benefit to him in his legal 
career. Every graduating class at 
an evening law school can boast 
member,s who are claim adjusters, 
law clerks, legal investigators, engi-
neers, accountants, and t ax practi-
tioners. At one time, such experi-
ence in a related legal field was the 
sole prerequisite to admission to the 
Bar. Now coupled with a -strong 
·academic education in law, this ex-
perience is greatly enriched. 
Finally, the professional atmos-
phere and competent .instruction at 
an evening law school compares fa-
vorably with a day law school. All 
accredited evening schools maintain 
full-time !faculties. In many cases, 
the night school is merely a.n exten-
sion or division of the day school, 
with the result that the courses and 
professors are interchangeable. The 
members of the faculty at William 
Mitchell have enviable reputations 
in the legal profession, both in active 
practice and in academic circles. 
The member,s of the Evening LJIIW 
School Committee of ALSA are 
anxious to commence work in the 
public relations area. It is one of 
the many areas where your Student 
Bar Association may meet its re-
sponsibility in providing for the 
needs of the student and the school. 
Alumni Loan Fund 
to Be Available in Fall 
by Jack A. Mitchell 
Arrangements are now being made 
with the First National Bank of St. 
Paul which will make available to 
William Mitchell students a loan 
fund of $100,000.00. 
Loans from thi-s fund, at a prefer-
ential interest ra te, will be available 
beginning with the fall -semester of 
1964 to a.II students having the ap-
proval of the Dean. Amounts will 
be available up to $600 per year and 
a cumulative 4-year maximum of 
$2,000. 
Approval of loans will ibe based 
upon a careful analysis of the scho-
la,stic prospects of each applicant, ais 
well as need . Approval may ,be given 
to first year and upper-class students 
alike. 
A student receiving a loan under 
this program will be required to pay 
nothing until six months after he 
has been graduated. At that time, 
repaym ent m ay be arranged for any 
period of up to four year-s. 
In order that this liberal pro-
gram may be arranged, it will be 
necessary for the school to place a 
guarantee fund of $20,000.00 on de-
posit with the Bank. The sole source 
of this fund will be a subscription 
of members of the Alumni Associa-
tion. The results thus far in the 
alumni drive for fund,s ,give assur-
ance that the program will ,be in ef-
fect by next fall. 
The Student Loan Fund might 
be compared to similar arrange-
ments made by the Law School at 
the University of Minnesota. There, 
the guarantee fund is but $3,000.00. 
Since the guarantee fund is small, 
loans under that program are avail-
able only to upperclassmen of high 
schola.::,--tic standing. 
Considerable interest was shown 
last fall in a ,poll of first, second 
and third year students and it is 
felt that equal interest will be shown 
next year when it becomes apparent 
to William Mitchell students that 
they may av,ail themselves of loans 
which, in the absence of other cola 
lateral, would be difficult to nego-
tiate. 
DICTA BY THE DEAN: Curtis Sums Up Six Years 
After six bu y years one- cannot contemplate walking away 
from as engrossing a ta k a tJ1e operation. of the "'illi-am 
J.\ilitdleil College of La.w has proved to be without some 
wrenching of ohe emotio111S and even of the heart. William 
.Mitchell has so dominate<l my life and Mrs. Cmti '"S that 
w·hen we tum our eyes to the west about Au"u t £rst, the 
departure .from "011r' school and 1tlhe countle ' friends we 
have made in nfim1esota will be accompanied by no little 
sacl.n . We have been aware of this i.nce the invitation 
from the Hastin{,~ College of the L aw (the second 'the' i· 
~ctually a part of the corporate name) .first arrived. We 
have 1ina.lly concluded, !however, tiliat, despite the f,act that 
I have thus far - and one of my frailties is hat I keep for-
getting how far that i - been fortlwate enough to keep a 
step or t"-o aihead of many 0£ the impairments of age I can-
not expect t o do o forever- and it seem discreet to accept 
the opportunity to tep out from under tbe pressures of 
deaning and resume the busy and .respo11Sible, but perhaps 
le wearing, acth~ties of teaching. And I l1ave ,to confess, 
of course, that the decision w.as m.ade much easier because 
ol my .knowledcre or the distinction of Hastings and the 
group of most interestina men iin it s " Over 65 ClU!b." 13ut 
:there are too m:any things mill to -be done to -spend more 
time and space on tlus s ubject. 
·stant D ean Heidenreich ·has ibeen kept bm,y with 
applications for a-dmission for next faWs dasses. For the last 
two months t!hey have been :mnning sixty per cent ahead of 
a year a,go. 
The drive among our alumni for. contributions to a 
guaranty fund tbait will make ~ible a much needed Stu-
dent Loan program :ha produced, after but one mailing, 
more than twenty per -cent oi the desired amount. The gifts 
have included two of '1000 each a.nd several of $100 or more. 
Thi- is grand con:fu:ma.tion of our conviction that. tb.e alumni 
of t:hi law ,school will contribute generou ly and ghdly 
if given the opportunity. We ,are now ccrtain that the 
tudent Lo~m program will be in operation this -summer. 
Fonner Chief JuBtice R oaer L . Dell '20, and J ames E. 
Kelley, '11, began -a year ago to develop a rp]an ito pay off 
the balance of our building mor,tgage. Judge D ell informs 
me that he expects t11e plan to rproduce -results within a 
few weeks. This is one of -Our most vital objective that must 
and can be abtained and in -short order. I still hope to smell 
the smoke of that mortgage -before I leave. 
Improvements in the physical plant expected to he a.ccom-
pli,sbed during the ummer include (1) paneling of ·bhe down-
stairs courtroom togel:/her with elevaiti:ng rtJhe ,bench an<l jury 
box, and installing a railing-around -the jury box •and witness 
tand; (Q) removing the wom oai,pet in the lounge an.cl 
replacing it with tile, and (8) deoorating in various ,parts oi 
the building. 
The opinion is widespread in tihe legal profession that law 
students need more training in the mechanics of tbe pmctice 
t!ha.n most law schoo1.s hav:e been able to supply . T he few 
states tha.t have tried appr,enticeship iprogr&lll-s have found 
them ineffective. William Mitchell ha ;probably done mor 
than most schools through its courses in dra.fting of legal 
documents, writing of m.emoranda and briefs a.nd it e.\:ten-
sivc l\loot Court program; 1hut it i- Tealized that much more 
is needed . Con ideration i being gi.ven. to inaugu:rating at 
our school a po t-graduation, post-bar emmination pre-
practice course that would give more intensive and ex:ten-
ive preparation for handling the varied iproblems in practice 
that are en.countered iby the new lawyer. The cour-se would be 
open to g111.dua,tes of other mw· :school, as well as our own, 
would meet fonr or :five evenings -each week for five, -six or 
seven weeks .bet,,een the end -0f the July ba-r exrunination 
a.nd the ibegin:ning of our school olasses in mid-September. 
The aim would be to •give the - tudent both irustruction. and 
p:ra.ctice in doing many things. Subj cts would include dr,a.£t-
ing many varieties of Jegal in truments; pr epa.ning ;papers for 
an.d handling gua.rcllimship, ,adoption, change of name atmc'h-
m:ent, garnishment, replevin unlawful detainer, mechanics' 
liens: foreclosing mortgages; pr,obate of estates· divorce; 
e..=.in.in" -abstracts an<l clearing of titles· b;iaffic court a.nd 
municipal court practice; workmen~s compensation; proies-
sional respons~bility; fa.w office management; fees for ervice.s. 
(Continued on Page 6) 
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The Uncertain Status of Apportionment: Baker v. Carr 
by Robert F. Collins 
All o-called 'ap_portionment cases ' scrutinize one characteristic Ia.ct 
situation: popuJaition disparities among state legislative cfutricts.1 Whether 
population disparities ru:e effected b the term of an apportionment la,w 
constitutional2 or tatutory,8 or hy ,the action of unconscionable and un-
scrupulous law ma.kers,1 the result is nonetheless the '5allle. The mo t 
_populou districts have the least legislative T.epresentation. 
In his prosecution of an arppor,tionment case, the tv.pica..l plaintiff alleges 
that this resu.lt <:onstitutes invidious discrimination in violation of his 
rights under tl1e equal prote<;tion 
~~~
clause. He brings a clas act ion 
a.gain t variou tate election offi-
cials0 under the Civil Rights ActG 
before a -three-judge federal district 
court.i He seeks a declar.a.tory judg-
ment invalidating the present appor-
tionment cheme an injunction 
restraining officials from holding fur-
ther elections thereunder and •he 
demands reapportionment by judicial 
decree. 
If plaintiff is pessimistic about his 
chances of ultimately securing t he 
apportionment he wants, he is rea-
onably certain (l } that hi claim i•s 
within the juriscliction of the court 
( 0 ) tbat he has standing to sue and 
(S) t ha.t his ~mplaint presents a 
justiciable controversy. So neld f:he 
uprem.e Court in Baker v . Carr,o 
on March 26, 1962. 
One tudent observed tfuat "it is 
hard to recall a. decision in modem 
history wh:idi ihas ih:a.d such &n im-
mediate a:ud 'Significa.nt effect. on t he 
practical course of events.' ~o By 
Novemiber 1 1962 apportionment 
caises were underway in no ]e:,,---s t han 
SO sta.tes.u By December. 1963 the 
number had grown to 42.12 
Baker v. Carr arose in Tenaes ee 
where eligible Yoters had quadrupled 
in number over the la t 60 years 
and st1bsta.ntial r ilistribution of ·the 
enlarged ·popu1a.tion currently per-
mitted 87% of lihe voter to elect 
60% of the enator ,and 40% to 
elect almost two-third of fo mem-
ber of the Hou..se. Alt.hough Tennes-
see s constitution required decennial 
reapportionmcu.t. and d t::,-pite cv-
eral non-judieial attempt to fore 
it, the state legi la.ture had failed 
to reapportion it eU since 1901. Up-
on these allega,tions the llipreme 
Court held p laintiff was entitled to 
a trial, and if proven, be would b 
granted a remedy. The ca.use of ac-
tion wa~ deemed justici.able because 
'judicially discoverable and manage--
ab] standards '13 were not la.eking. 
The court did not pUl"pOrt to say 
wha,t the e judicial ta.ndards were 
however, nor did it d.iscu~ how the 
cau e of action should be measured 
and implemented by the lower court . 
Ju-ti<:e Brennan, writing for a. 6-o 
majority, dismissed the question 
with one sentence: 
Judicial tandards under the 
Equal Protection Clause are 
well developed and familiru:, and 
it bas been open to cour,ts since 
the en"IWtmen.t of the Four-
teenth Amendment to deter-
mine, if on the particular £acts 
they mu t, that a discrimmation. 
reflects no policy, but simply 
ia11bitrary and capricious 11(:-
tion.14 
1 An ua.p_portioJ1:ttJent ease."" in the lexi~on oi 
lh.e Jeg;.l p-rafeuio.n, m.rty P-1.M) ra-.!cr to .Uii g.if. ti un 
in.\lolving: tb.o appo-rtionmcnL of Un.Jtcd_ Stat e 
cong:rCJ".a.donal distri cl.!t. .AllhotJgh cli.c con;rct · 
ion.a1 r,rohlem mar h t: !ac iually simllu to Lluu 
o f th e t tnte. their re11poetfve .solu tionJ: ·r equ.fre 
tho ta p-plic4Li0 o 0 £ d.i ffo.tcnt COil8tituti.onnl prin-
ciplc!S . .For t!rl.J l eliOU, ;and ilio bcaaulile a 
rec~c up·ram t: Conn deciiiou t.h.corel.J.c:tlly 
moou the congres.ai onnl e.n.igma, .a. diic-uuion o f 
con;:re.u.ioa.111 malapporl:i9umm:d: ~ bovo·ncl the 
1copr: of thi3 note. See W Mherey v. · S:tnclcB. 
32 U.S.l .. Weck <1142 ( CLS. T oh. 17, 1% !). 
•E.,., Germano , •. Kerner, 220 F. u:pp. 230 
(N.D . .111. 1963), oppool dockuod. ~a .S .L. 
Weck 3228 (0 .5. , ov. 20, 1963,) (No. 63d). 
•E., .. Mo .. v. Bui klutrr, 220 F . Supp . !<1 9 
W.D. Oki• . 1963). appeal doclc.i<d. , u b nom ., 
Willium, v. Mo... 32 U.S.L. Weck &170 (U.S. 
Sept. JS. 1.963) No. 476). Mo.lapportionmetu 
cu:at ed by l ow is. 5-om t!tlme 11 c_a.Ucd de Jacto 
melappo·nionmenc. Aul.ion . Th e. &/tarmae.l, 
of Baur . Curr- A,. A.d ,·,mrn~ in Judlciol 
E:r.parim,:ru.ati.on, 51 CA.UT. L. Rn•, 535. 536 
(l96S . 
• E.1 .• Bokor '"· Ca.rr. 269 (I.S. 186 (1962) . 
Wbe.rc ·tho le.~iili t uro -rcfu.ses to rea pportion 
d61pilc a con.ithn tiomt.l -di,-e.ctil"C t Q do ao. zbc 
result is c;i.Ucd de ifl.7e :in.ala:ppor fiomni::n t . cc 
..-\eel.ion. 11q,ra., 
51!hc q_ue1tJon of who a:re proper. o c~fl!i:!!1u) 
and 1.nc~ea ~ lcr pn..rt y defea<ls..ot! hLl5.. to the 
'w.ritm'a knowledge, been d.i&c-u&&cd in only ono 
case an d then v.c-ry· Cllt.!lorily . . t: o Meryl.imd 
Citi.vmt Committ.i:.o (QJ: Fair Coogf't!S!iomtl Re-
d i,5trJc.tini:t v. To.wet.. 226 "f. up_p. 80. 8..1 ·n. 
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Today, what may have been 'well 
developed and fumiliar" in M~rch, 
1962, J,s still ,a. reoogni7,ed my te.ry15 
at non-United States upreme Court 
levels. The various federal district 
and state · upreme court were ,given 
the opporhmi ty to fuid standard~ 
a.nd they ,have proceeded to discover 
and iapp1y a multitude of them. 
Eighteen of these lower court deci-
sions, many of them irreconcilable. 
Me now noted on the Supreme Court 
doc.ket.10 The Court must finally 
answer the question it ·avoided fo 
Baker v . Carr; within a matter of 
months, it will be forced to define 
a.nd delineate a number of accept-
able .a.n.d non-acceptable judicial 
standards for testing challenged 
st.ate legislative aP,POrtionmcnts un-
der the equal protection dau e. 
'11he purpose of thi paper i to 
consider what those standard might 
be. 
Hints from the Supreme Court 
A indicated, Justice Bren.nan 
spent one sentence m1 a discussion 
of aippli:ca.ble criteria. Thi one sen-
ten{:'e :;tatement, however provides 
a helpful starting point . Fitst , the 
ca.use of action pr · urpposes a 'dis-
crimination." If all distric ts were ap-
portioned with ma:them atical pre-
cision, if no one were denied a tull 
vote in equality ~ th. any oth r 
voter, there would be no ibasi for 
a claim to reapportion. coodly, 
i>t i- a. discrimination whieb " reflects 
no policy, hut simply al.'bitrary an<l 
oopri.cious action• that i unconsti-
tutional. 'l1his 'S'Uggests conversely 
that a discrimination which .reflects 
som,e policy, some rational, non-
arbitrary non-capricious policy 
might be condoned. Furthermore, 
ii ar,bitraciness a.nd capriciousne ~ 
present questions of degree ma the-
matica.1 exactitude is not necessary. 
Thirdly the court's deternriml.tion 
MuryJ11.nd 1964). wh• r• ,hr court •aid : 
o .• • 1hlnk th•• the dc landanto [ tho 
i overaor 1U1d the , ecret:ary of si:1110) arc 
proper pcu:tic1. 1ha.r tho Do.:1rdt of E1ec1ion 
Su-puvison of .Lhe. ,·11.ri.ous _poU t..i.a l sub · 
divi sioM (;I f thu ta re JD:C not indi11pe n5nhlc 
pnrdcs, i:md tha t • dee-rec .aca-in.5t tha: 
pr-e11eaL dcJe.nd:uiu would he eJI-,C:tive. wit:h-
ont joiu..l nir the ulC(l ti<;m bo&.1.'dli. 
In Mo.s Y. BDTkb..11.rt, .su.pro., p lai.nt.i..11: jqfo~d 
the • tn.te trca• u.rer, tlso atro.rncr ;t1t1.ena.l .lllld 
hi• 6.n.t 45.iUta..at, thci auditor, mcmbeq, or lho 
Jlllte tu com.mil6ion, rne.mbca; o.I the •·luc efoc -
tio.n_ boa.rd a.nd Lh.e govtJ:rccrr. ft wotJJd seem th.a.t 
an r .m.e.mher of the t ovcrnmcnt who pflrfornu. a.ny 
fu:nc Lion rela.t:l.ng t o the oonduat of cle~tio11$ h 
a! l eaat potentially a proper p;uty dclc.nd.a.nL 
W1ietb.u- this it c.orrcCit p.rocedU£c, however.. i, 
4.Jlol.ba.r ma.ttor , In ndd.ition. to v.atlonf 5UUe . offi-
oi.I,,, tho pWn1H! in J.is co ~. Love. 219 F. 
upp. 922 (D. Cofo. 1963), appeal dookotcd 
w.b n,om. •• L uc.as v. F or h ·-Fou:rth. Gc-noul At:~ 
umbl · o{ Colorado, 32 O.S.L. W~d: 3180 (.U .S. 
Sept. 30. 1963) ·o. 508), joiru:d the entlr¢ 
1-tn te l epi,lo: tu.toa 1£ U10 p o1n ~.[! to ata thorh:o itnd 
oif.e.01uD.1t: pariod.i.c 1o.ai1po.rticmmenr resu: with 
the lc~lot ur-c... . .ti. I is, ll! u.a Uy tho 1Ht:.5c, it li!i 
dll~uh to • ~c why t bat body a !I ll.. wh ole is 
uo r a.l'wa )'111 imH!lp-tn 11:i..ble in lltlg1:1 tion of thl~ 
oa ttuc. 
a 
Every parsJln who. under coior of an • 
&;t.11.lu.Le, ocd..li:uaaco, rcgul.u.tfon , cu1u om, o.r 
usa,::e . or :an"" ala.Co or tarritory, sul;,feeti 
or · tu1t.U1 e:1 t..o b t.1 r ubjie=cted, any c~izo:n of 
t he U a..ile.d Stater or othar p erson whhira 
must be made on the "particular 
mets". Presumably, because of geo-
graphic. hi t<>rical and economic dis-
similarities, any given apportion-
ment situation will diller from every 
otboc a.nd each will require indi-
vidual attention and analysis. 
Justice Brennan cha-r-a.cterized the 
partieula.r facts of Baker ·v. Carr as 
follows: 
" [ Appellants'] constitutional 
claim is, in substa.nce that the 
1901 statute constitutes arbi-
trary and capcicio11 s tate ac-
tion, offensive to the Fourteenth 
Am.enclment in its iil'ational 
disregard of the standard of a,p-
portionment prescribed by the 
state' <:onstitution or of ,any 
standard. effecting a gro s dis-
proportion of representation to 
voting population. The injury 
which appellant assert is that 
t his cl;i.ssi£cation oisiavors the 
voters in the counties in "'hich 
they reside, placing them in a 
position of constitutionall un-
justifatble inequality , ri.s-a..-vi 
voters in irrationally favored 
counties."17 
Among the "gross disproportions" al-
leged a single vote in Moore Count. 
was supposed to have been worth 
19 votes in Hamilton County, and 
one vote in tewart or Chester 
County worth 8 times a vote in 
Shelby or Knox County. 
If •these facts are true, a the 
Court assumes, and if they tale a 
claim upon. which relief may be 
granted a - the Court hold , then 
evidence of population ratios is ex-
tremely import.ant. If, by reciting 
the gist of plaintiff ' claim and b~, 
a.ffuming lts justiciabililty. the Court 
described an unconstitutioruil situa-
tion, then perhaps the Cowt ruled 
.sub silentiio tha t ratio o.f 19 to 1 
and 8 to 1 in ·and of themselves 
violated the standards of the eqmil 
prot tion d a.1s . Righ.t1y or wrong-
I •, 1lhi inference is the closest thing 
to an objective tanclard that can 
be extracted from the opinion.IS 
Justice Douglas modifies " ili"-
crimination" by the term 'invidi-
ous" in •bi coneurring opiuion.19 
Although not once mentioned by 
the majori ty, ' invidiou discrimina-
tion" .has ince served ,as the ulti-
=te test in aJl lower court deci-
sion . 
J ustice Cl.ark. on his part, said 
that "No o)le ... contend · that 
mat hematical equality among the 
voters is r quired by the equal pro-
tection clau e. But certainly there 
must be ome rational desi,,on. to a 
staite's disb:icting."2(1 He further 
charact erizecl the Tennessee appor-
tionment a s "loco":!l a.nd as a. "crazy 
quilt willbout rational basis. •!!2 
On April S3, 1962, the Co~rrt , p e.r 
cmiarn . wi,thout elaboration, ,,a-
cated a judgment of tJhe l\fichigau 
upreme Court and remanded for. 
further consideration. in the light 
of Baker ·v . Oarr. The facts of the 
oase23 were similar ,to Bak 'T ibut 
jt ha.d ibeen decided on the pleadings 
L.b_e j.u.risdictioti thereof to th~ dop~va:tion 
of an~- righ t.!;., p.rl-vi legu.. or immu.ni tles 
§CG-urcd by lhe eon1titution ft.ad 1.n:wa, 
-.hall be liable. to Lha rut)• inj ured in an 
t1.etlon aJ: law. au.ll :i.n equity, or o th cT 
prope:r proc(lcding: fo r rod.res!. Rev. -w. 
§ 1979 J,816) , 42 u .. c. f 191l3 (1959) . 
7T.hre6 j udg, fil s:u:~ Tcq uired c_o enjoin the 
og.eration of n li ta.\e -5"1.0tlne. 28 u_s.c. 228\. 
I 2284. Di,ecl "!'POW to th-c -upr.,.,,o. Court 
ma.)' be taken from thcic doeisi.oD. 28 U. • • I 
l2S8a Pl.11.iu ti fE , o r eounll!. may instead 111cek 
cedres& in h.i& own 1tt1 te court as. wu aue.mptad 
jn Ma.ryl.nnd Commit1ccr for Fa-ir Repu:e~ntu-
tlon v. T, wc~, 229 Md. <l(J6, 184. A.2d 715 
(1962), nppaul dack ¢1dtl. 32 U • .L. ' OU 3015 
(0. . Oot. 24, 1962) (No. 554, 1962 T=m ; 
ronumbecod Jlio . 29, 1963 T o,m) ; but the great 
pn ~-pondl'.'.r:11.llco of apport io"Dm~t ~e.s a.re Jn~ -
tute-d in fcdcmtl diatr.h::t i;O\lrt. 
S Qf the 18 ap portionmnit :sppt-W no·w .no t d 
on the uprerno Court docl<:cr. No. go, W .M.C J\ .• 
Inc. v, Sl.mo·n ; No. 23, Reynold, ,·. Sime; No. 
24. Beadle ~. Sc.hollc; No~ 27, Vzm:t: v. Friok ; 
o. 29. Marybnd Commi"Llee for "Fair Rep-re· 
~cnta tioo ,,, T•wes; ·o. 41 • ..\lcConncll -..·. Frlnk: 
N o. 69, 01n tl!S v. Mo.nu : No. 29-Z:t Swaun. v, 
Adams ; _ o. 307. Rom..ln "'°• Sincoe.k ; 1 o. 381. 
Meyc:r..1 " · T bfgpi!! n : No. ·'-54, Nola.11 v. Rhod.csi 
No. 455. Sive ,... Ellis : No. 476, Willia.tt1 !!1 v. 
Mosa ; No. 508., Lueo~ '"• Forty .. .Founh Ge.nentl 
AMemhly ol ColoroJo ; No. 534. OlclaholTlll F•rm 
13u:re:au v • .\loH ; ~ o. S--16. Baldwln "'· ·MC'.JM; 
N(J , SS91 Luco v. .\ .d;.,m5-; No. 636,. G-crmano , •• 
K~ Ti 8 were 1.n k, n h)' p lni.nr i.fis a.n d 10 by 
defend.1..b t.!.. The l8 a:ppea.t.. bow.e.,·c rs Tepre:1e.~1 
be.fore Baker was decided. By a.void- that legislative a.pportionment may 
ing_ a di cussion of the merits in effect numerical disparitie up to 
successive decisions, the Court dis- a point. :Moreover if the Court is 
pelled any doubts that the lower giving eriou.. consideration to the 
courts should ha.ve the first op- validity of rt.he federa.1 principle" a-
,portunity to fonnulat e applicabJe applied to tate legi latures, it is nec-
tandards. essarily debating· whether Baker v. 
In June 196!, the Court reached Ca,rr should have a11111 a.pplicability 
the same conclusion with almost the to one :branch of 'the legislat ure -O 
same dearth of di,scu ion, in long as the other i apportioned 
W M.C.A.. v . Sirnon.2·1 It did, how- without invidious discrimination. 
ever, recapitulate t he Baker 'hold- On February 17, 1964 in Wes-
ing. "[.A] ju ticiable federal con ti- berry v. Sanders 3.1 the Court ta,r.-
tutional cause of -action is tated tled the nation with the latest o.f 
by a claim of arbitrary impairment its pronouncements on apportio)l-
of votes by means of inviiliously- m ent. ' [The) command of Allticle 1, 
discriminatory geographic classifica- § 2 that representatives be chosen 
tion."25 'Dhis langu'a.ge has sigoifi- 'by the people of the everaL la te. ' 
cance only in that it officially, in- means tJha.t as nea.cly as i practi-
corp orates "invidious" into Ii.he cable one ma.n's vote in a con,,<rre -
ultimate ·test and eem to recognize ional election j to be worth as 
a degree of discrimina.tion which is much a another's."32 The equal 
constitutionally peroiissible. protection clause does not form any 
In Mru:ch, 1968, the Court decided basis for the de~ion, nor does the 
Gray v . Sanders.26 Georgia s Demo- majority discuss rationality a.s a 
cmtic Party employed a county judicial t_andard. Baker 1., . Carr 
unit sy tem a a basis for counting was cited on the que tion of jus-
votes in its primary for the nomina- tici hility, hut further reference to 
tions of statewide office.rs a.nd U.S. jt was omitted. If anything perti-
enators. One third of the .total nent to the problem of state le.gis-
population of the .gta.te residecl in ]at ive apportionment can be implied 
a. majority of the leas t po:pulou from the case it i:s thi : A.ssumina 
voting di~tricts, ~d thu. w~ able the "fecl~l princip]e ' constitutes 
t~ elect It noilllllees de pl te . the a valid j udfoial criterion, and is 
1V1shes of the other two third . adopted b 4:1. sw.te.. a its method 
Ba.ker v. Oarr was cited upon the of apportionment. when one branch 
i ues of the jurisdiction. justiciable of the legislatur~ is classified "eo-
contr~;er~ and ta.uding to ue. graplrica.lJy "'ithout semblance"' of 
But ~e !3aker v . Carr: [tl1e numerical equality, then the other 
case] did not mvolve a. question of branch should Jogicall · be held to 
the degree to which the equal pro- a trict aoherence to the one man-
tection clause limits the authority one vote prin<:iple. Like the ni led 
of a. state legi la.ture in designing taites Con,gre.ss there shouJd be no 
geograpbjcal districts Irom which iliscrimination in at least one 
representations are c.hosen . . . . '27 branch to th.e extent that m athe-
" o:r did "it present th.e question , in- maticaJ preci'Sion i- reasouablv feas-
hetent in the bica01eral form of our ib]e. Mere non-invidiou- disorimina.-
Federal Govemment, whether a tion "-ill not uffice. 
:ta.rte may have one house chosen 
w ithout cr:egard to population."!! 
The ,holding wll,S limited to di crim-
inations within a sin le geograph-
ical unit - in tbi ein , the tate. 
"Once [it] . .. is de -igna.ted, all 
w h-0 participate in the election are 
to h ave an eq_rutl vote . . . . "20 Or. 
as Justice tewart said concurring. 
"within -a. given constit uency tJ1ere 
Balter v . OaTr was ment ioned in 
one other Supreme ourl deci · on. 
concerning the issue of standing te 
ue. Aside from these five above 
mentioned cases, it· meaning and 
portent ha.Ye never been discussed 
or interpi;etecl by its au.thor. The 
lower courL have been left t-0 for-
mulate their own guidelines. 
can be room for but a single onstl- Standard and Remedies Set by 
tutionaJ rule - one man one vote.":{ the Lower Courts 
Trh e Court did not an alogize I. 
Gray's county unit system with leg-
i la.tive districts. It might .have held 
that the ilistinction " "-3.S witbout 
"1'111Vidi rn.ts discrim.i-nation, "ra-
tionality" and plairbtiff's bw den 
of proof. 
ubstanoe, and that legi latiu:es as 
·"~ell a govern.or and senator 
hould be elected by voter who 
stand in full equality with one 
another. It might have taiken t he 
opportunity to proohi.im that the 
one man-one vote", or _population 
principle would thereafter apply in 
both sit uations. 
T,he very fact th.at it did not 
equate ,the two however. may have 
signi:fica.uee. 1llie consti.tu tionaJ au-
thority of a tate to design geo-
gr.aphical districts from which rep-
resentative are chosen presents a 
'question of degree. ' 'Dhis indicat 
o nly 1weh'c ..t.ifi~root 1Uat ns n.ad in only b n..lf 
of the gus t.t:?:s w e.TC pfa.lnrifilf SUCC C'NfuJ . 
o 369 0 .s. 186 (1962). 
11l Mc..Cfoske)', Th a S upreme Co1'rt 1961 Tum. 
FurctJ:ord : Th 11 R.capport.icnm.snl Case, 70 H...utv. 
t. . RE,. », 56 ( 1962) . 
ll.Stn tist;ic• . cited b y J. lla.rl:m. dl•..,ntlng, 
c,.., v. Sondeu,. 37:l U. , a68, 382 (l!l(i3). 
-u\Vall t. J ogrnal. Feb.tu11.ry 19, 196!, p . 3. 
col. 2. 
18 369 U • • • • 21 T. 
>< Id. ••· 226. 
~ Soc, for e-xa.mple, Cerm~o ,.. Ke.r.ncr. 2::?0 
T . upp. 230, 23-1-235 N.D. m. 1963). oppcol 
dockcwJ, 32 0 . . L. Week. 322S (U.S. Nov. 20, 
1963 No. 636) : 
Xeedlc11a lo ,ay the di,.-·e.::g-cnt. viow• found 
iu the obo~e cited opin ions are a clenT 
iDdico.1ion that lb>$ ,gitnt1ra l Uiea.e bu not )'e t 
bec:u de:cidea b y llie upr~e Court . uch 
11 d cciaion should be £o rlheomi a i; in the 
rcl.'lt:ivcl.)· near futurr P mOft o f the ,:n~efi 
t!irnd in thlli memorandum (1 wo uld hllpe 
a nJ. .11.D.tieip ata Lb:i t thi1 case " 'ill j oi:-o Lhcm 
are pro,m:ntly p.tw.dinG b cforo t he Coun, 
Al•o, itos• ,.. Burkhart. 220 F. upp. 149. 
156 (W.D. OJ.fa, 1963 ) , oppeal dcck,,ud , ub 
nom., W!Uionu ,·. 'lou, 32 • . I.. W•clt 3170 
(U .S. Sopt . 18, 1963) (No. 4-76) : 
1t mB.J' woll ho t.hnt I h a.flirm.uiy-c: rcliof 
W1! irr a.ut. h1 ill 0 :1:<1. l!!!!i or 01.lr judic ial powc.r:. 
If lo. we will know in doc lime, for the: 
qu08 Liom arc &qu" r ly v reticn t~d. anJ wHl 
1l ndQuhtcdJ,- b e: au thorJ t :s tive.1 d«icled d t.rr• 
fog t"he ac.i.t u:1rm o f tht!I Suprcime Co.urt. 
Th re eem to be common recog-
nition among court s of an init ial 
presumpti·on in favor of the con i-
tutionality of the apportionment law 
in question. The plaintiff, in1'higpen 
. M eyers 33 for example. bad the 
bur.den of rebutting such a pre-ump-
t.ion by producing evidence of suffi-
cient magnitude to make ou t. a. 
prima facie case of inYidiou di -
crimination . Having done so, de-
fendants were obliged to ·how that 
there existed some ration.al basis for 
the di parities. Invidiou.; discrimi-
nation may be e tabli -hed b~, ta-
(Continued on Page 5 ) 
t t'I e.a no t (! 8, ,'fUpra. 
.17 369 U .s . •• 207-2o/l, 
"":1-8The M ic:;hlgan uprcmt: CouTt 1$ the oaly 
court; thus b .. r Jo have p:roma.Jg:u cd .a l lltndiud 
b.ued upon ..liJH!'c::i fh: rmpulu ion riu lr,:!o. 
''When a. J~gisl4li,•e apporrloamc.o.t pro,-id~ 
dhtrlob hi1Vlng_ more Lha.n doublo tho popaln-
liDn of o t.Jnin\ thQ constitutional ca.utc o[ 
diJu;;rc lion ls "ialatod. Thu i, not to U lf" thn.~ 
less t ha.:n such 2 to 1 ratio i!!' c-ooatltu li~ni,Uy 
good. IL f.11 to .-'llY only t:hoi peril t: rub .ind 
dhu~~r oc;;co:.r,i 1''.hc:u. tha lim: j.5 c rnMed.'' 
c.ho1Je , . Hare, 36i Mfoh. 176, 116 1'.W .2d 350 
( 1.962), <ren . grnn.«d 1ub nom •• !lelLdlo <- Scholle, 
32 IT .. L. W•ek S:!liG r .S. Oct. l.,. 1962) \No. 
517. 1962 1'&m; ron tunbOTod ~fo. 2~ 1963 T.!l'rm). 
""369 0 • at 24-1. 
'"' Id . OI 258. 
~ Id. at 257 . 
"'Id. at2.6l. 
"" 9h0Uo v . Hore, 269 U.S. 429 '1962 ) . 
~. 370 U . 190 (1962). 
"" Id . <Lt 191. 
ll'l3;2 .s. 368 (1963). 
"' Id. at 376. 
"'lblil . 
'!B /d . at 379. 
"' Id. Ill 38L 
'"·32 U.S.L. w •• k .a.,12 U.S . Fob. 17, l 91iol) . 
"' Id. ~ t 41'13. 
'"' 211 F . Supp. 826 (W .D. ._.1, . 1962 , appw 
dock trt l!.d ~u..b n Qm ., Me)'on; , . T hi.J!f, N 11 
4
32 
U •• L . Weck 310S (U.S. Auir. Hi, 196.l) No. 
381). 
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Judicial Dilemma: Primary vs. Secondary Picketing 
by Thomas J. Mcleod 
"Statutory construction in doubtful rases, in the last analysis, is a choice 
among competing policies as starting points for reasoning."1 In such words 
might one explain the continuing conflict in the de{!isions of the National 
Labor Relations Board construing section 8(b)(4)2 as it relates to picketing. 
'I'he legislative history reveals that this section, as amended in 1959, is 
aimed at relieviIJJg the primary employer from pressures resulting from 
loss of business <brought about ·by coercive actions directed by a union 
toward neutral employers -and employees. 
May a union picket on railroad ---=-
right-of-way ,adjacent to employers 
premises at a gate which employees 
were not permitted to use when the 
picketing is manifestly for object of 
preventing railroad employees from 
handling employer's goods? 
In Carrier Corp. v. NLRB3 the 
union struck the plant of Oarrier 
Corp. and placed pickets at all en-
trances to the plant. Immediately 
south of the plant was a spur of the 
New York Central Railroad used to 
serve Carrier and other plants in the 
area. The railroad owned a right-of-
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way that was enclosed by a fence ~
which was a continuation of one en-
closing Carrier'.s premises. Access to 
the right-of-way was provided by a 
gate located on railroad property.4 
This gate was also picketed hy union 
members and this ,activity is the 
subject for review in this case . When 
railroad ,superv,isory personnel at-
tempted to pass through the gate 
£or the purpose of ',spotting' and 
picking up box cars, the union mem-
bers threatened them and blocked 
the entrance. Mr. Thomas F . Maher. 
the Trial Ex;aminer, issued his In-
termediate Report finding that the 
Respondents had violated section 
8(b)(4)(i) and (ii)(B) of the Act. 
The Board reversed, finding that 
Respondents did not violate section 
8(b)(4),(i)(B) or 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) on 
the ,ground that the work being per-
fol'!Iled by those passing through 
this gate was related to normal 
plant operation and consequently 
ihe econdary boycott prohibi.tion 
did not apply. On appeal to the 
econd Circuit Judge Wat rman 
_reinstated the find ing of the Trial 
"E,mminer. H re ited that in picket-
ing· the railroad rigb.t-of-way lhe 
union was not furthering its legiti-
mate objective of publicizing its di -
pute to Ca.rri r employees but w,a 
attempting to induce the railroad to 
cease dealing with .Carrier. Judge 
Lumbard dissented submitting that 
the picketing was "primary activity." 
Board Decisions - 1947 to 1952 
Prior constructions of section 
8(b)(4) can .perhaps best be divided 
into two time periods. 'Dhe first 
period, beginning with the enact-
ment of the Taft-Hartley Act in 
1947 and terminating in 1952, may 
be characterized by relatively nar-
row constructions of sec. 8(b)(4) . 
The cases may be further su·bdi-
vided into those involving picket-
ing at the premises of the primary 
employer and those involving pick-
eting at neutiial premises. 
" Lt is clear tha,t the activities 
here in question violate the statute 
if the statute is read literally."5 
However, the Board and the courts 
have given these sections a "com-
plex interpretive gloss,"6 declaring 
that they must be interpreted and 
not read literally. The basic diffi-
culty one encounters with a literia.l 
1 Fa,1,~ 1tF1IR·t~ & GnEE-N>t. 11h t Ulbor Lnjuuc· 
tlao 169· (1930) , 
• 6t 1111. 1-U (J.947), 29 U.S.C. <<>, 158(1, 
(4) (19S8). •• omeodeil, 29 . . C. oc. 153 b) 
(•L) (Supv . Ul, 1962). am .... ding -19 S1ot. •i.52 
il9lS) . Tho mien.al vor1Iom ol Sr.c. 8. .. 
arue:,dcd b l' 73 S tal . 542 /19S9 ) . pr .. enlly r .. d 
,.. follows : 
{b) lL alnill be JJ.D un.lufr labor pnuu .. ice for n 
la.bnr o r::,nai:w1ion OT iti Dgcn:tJi -
4) (lJ 1.0 e.oga;.e in. o.r 10 indnoc or en • 
cow:a;i: G..D f iadlvi--du.al c.mp.loy~ by .an penon 
e.ngag,:d in COJ1tm.c.ro.c or in s.o induJilr'.f rdfoclin, 
com.me.rec to e:ng-4:e: i.n , a st.riko or 5. -r~ftHlial in 
lru! Cour.&e of cmpJo •.moof to ll.l:~ , "UI.QD.Uf:l.t: LuTC., 
proceu. tra.miport. or oth~'i,o h~dl e or wo_r,k 
oa ttn)· t,ootll, llt.lelt:!!, ma te.rl.A.a. or- commod.i-
til",:5 or lo parfon:u i:w.y sar!'i~; fir (ii lO 
threaten., coctc'lt o:r: :r;est ra:in an ' parson cwp.Red 
ln com.men::e oT in llD. indiutry a.ftoct.i.n; con,mercet 
wlu:re in e.ith.er (l,11.1e a.n o.hjaa t lhe.reof is. -
(B I6re.i?1g ru- r~qui.cl.ng a.n~· pc:rlioU to C!.llllBe 
lllin,g::, uillin::;, h[l.ndllng, traml])ortin,:::, o r o,Jw_r. 
wise dealing in the produds of an}' prod.uce.r, 
reading is that tl"aditional 'Picketing 
around the premises of an employer 
with whom a union has a dispute 
almost inevitably involves some in-
terference with the relations be-
tween that employer and. his sup-
plieris or customers. It is clear from 
the legislative history of the act that 
this activity was not intended to be 
outlawed. 
To accommodate the apparent 
conflict between the literal lanruage 
of the statute and tl1e Congre ionaJ 
purpose, the Board and the courts 
have evolved a "primary-secondary 
activity" di•stinction.7 The line that 
has been dra:wn between these two 
kinds of activity is very fine and in-
volves distinctions which one court 
considers "more nice than obvious."8 
The did.otomy between p,rimary 
and seoondary picketing is "unques-
tionably the area of greatest difficul-
ty and importance in the admin-
istration of the statute.''9 
From the eaiiliest cases, the Board 
ruled that all picketing at the p:relil -
is ~ of ~he !Primary emplo~•er , , as 
immune from the '.!)I O criµtions of 
section 8(b )(4) . .10 
Rel.mi"'" 011 th legUative hi tor~' 
rather than a. literal in terpreta.tion 
of the ta.tute the Board maintained 
thi:s 1position even when it was clear 
t!hat tJhe picketing could ,have no ap-
peal but 1tJo emrployees of neutral 
employers. In United Elec. Workers 
(Ryan Constr. Corp.), 11 the union 
picketed the entire premises of the 
primary •employer induding a sepa-
rate gate whioh had been erected .to 
provide ingress for the employees of 
a neutral contractor doing work on 
t•he premises of the primary employ-
er. The Board deternnined that such 
activity, when performed wholly at 
the premises of the primary employ-
er "cannot be called '-secondary 
even though, ais is vir.tua!Jy always 
the case, an object of the picketing 
i:s to dissuade aU pel"sons from en-
tering such premises for business 
reasons."12 
Tu govern situations when picket-
ing activities 'look p1ace on neutral 
premises, the Boa:rd developed what 
is now referred to as " the situs of 
the dispute," or "the a rea of pri-
mary conduct" doctrine. 
The first ·application of this doc-
trine carving out a new and broader 
pro1:,cssor. Or nmaufactu.nrr. or to <1 'l!!iC doiug 
b1,1Jll.Oeu with n.tT}' ot.he.i: pi:non, or for Ing- or 
r-tiquiring Emy ot..be.r eimplo)'ct t i) reciogn.lt,:r or-
b:i.rgal.n witb a, labor orpnwlti.on 111 the repre.-
s:en ta.tho or 11.til c1np\o~·'1ee u nlesa suob lnbor o·r · 
,:.nniuu.iem hB.lj been i.::eiti6.ed Ai the reprose.ata..ti...-
of !ll Uflh cruployuet uwlcr lhc pro\1.sions or .te<!tion 
9; 
ProiJfdi::d, Th.at noth.1.ng c.oula.lned in LhI, c:i:1.u11~ 
(b) shall be con51rucd to ru.olr.c unlawful, whe re 
not oth c,.r:wi111ce uohndul. a.ti. )' p rfmory nr.lk.c ur 
prhrutry piclcetin•; 
Provided , Thtu a olhin& i::ontalned 1n t..hi s sllh-
*Ution (b) l!ihall be com11ru.cd to mnk~ u.nh.wiul 
D i elutrol b:r nn r p e-non tn enter upon tho 
_p rcm.t.se._ of n.o y employer othe: th::ui h.i!!i own 
employer), li th emplo)'tQ of 11uch emp'loytt 
11.rc en; l!lgcd la a .fi triku t11.li6~d or ID._ppr.o\·od b)' 
a. rcp r es1:1htO.tive of .au~h emplo Ce11 whu.m a.ll eh 
emplofe.r is rnquireil Lo r aCtoifi l!U! under lhht 
tl(:t, • ~ • 
Prior to 19$9, "''ha.~ ls no\( tb,e fu t portion of 
s:ubpu • !l"'Ph (B) wa, fou.ad io ,ubp•<•graj)h (A 
acCO"Tdingl , m.a:ny nte.tnl Tofc-rence5 u c to .... ~ 
geographical area of immunity based 
on the "si,tus of the dispute" con-
cept was in Local 807, Teamsters 
Union (Schultz R efrigerated Serv.) . 
There, Schultz moved hrs place of 
business from New York City to 
New Jersey, replacing m embers of 
the New Yol'k union by drivers from 
a New Jersey local. Schultz contin-
ued to do !business in New York. 
The Board ,allowed members of the 
New York loca,l to picket around 
his trucks while they were being 
loaded or unloaded at the premises 
of New York City customers. The 
Board admitted that there is no 
distinction between lawful iprimary 
picketing and unlawful Se{!Ondary 
picketing. Both are directed at in-
fluencing third parties to withb.old 
their business from t1he struck em-
ployer. However, "one important 
test of the lawfulness of a union's 
picketing ,activities in the course of 
its dispute with an employer is the 
identification of such picketing with 
t!he •actual functioning of the pri-
mary ernployer',s business a t the 
situs of the labor dispute."13 
It was evident at the outset that 
certain limitations would lbe required 
to effectively apply the "·situs of the 
dispute" doctrine and the Board 
availed itself of the situation arising 
in Sailors Union (Moore Dry 
Dock)14 to impose such limitations 
in the form of the oi!ten-quoted 
"Moore Dry Dock Conditions." 
"Picketing of the premises of a 
secondary employer is ;primary if it 
meets 1:lhe foHowi.rug conditions: 
(,a) the picketing is ,strictly 
limited to times when the situs 
of the dispute is located on the 
secondary eID1ployer's premises; 
(b) at the time of the picket-
ing the ,primary employer is en-
gaged in its normal business at 
the situs; 
(c) the picketing is limited to 
places reasona:bly close to the 
location of the situs; 
(d) the picketing discloses 
clearly that the dispute is with 
t,he primary em:ployer."15 
Schultz and Moore Dry Dock are 
difficult to reconcile with three 
closely-preceding "neutral" or "com-
mon~situs" Board decisiorus.16 All 
three involved disputes concerning 
the use of non-union eID1ployees at 
construction sites. The Board did 
not rely upon the 'Primary-secondary 
activity di-stindion but found a vio-
lation of sec. 8(b ){ 4) on the ground 
that an objective of the unions' ac-
tion was to force the general con-
tiiactors to cancel t·heir contracts 
with ·sub-contractor-employers of 
non-union men. 
One year later, on June 4, 1951 
the Supreme Court handed down 
four dec]sions 1emphasizing its un-
willirugness to rely solely on the geo-
griaphical distinction as a determi-
nant of primary and secondary ;pick-
eting. In NLRB v . International 
Rice Milling Co. ,17 union18 mem-
bers were picketing the premises of 
Kaplan Rice Mills in order to secure 
recognition of the union as the col-
lective bargaining representative of 
·the mill employees. The union mem-
bers encouraged the drivers of a 
truck of a neutral customer to re-
frain from entering the premises to 
8(b) (4) (A). However. cases decided oiler 1959 
refer to Sec. 8(b)(4)(B). Except io a few in-
stances I shall simply refer to Sec, S(b) (4). 
3 311 F .2d 135 (2d Cir. 1962). 
" The Trial Examiner's findings show that this 
gate was padlocked when n ot oJ)ened for railroa d 
switching operations . Railroad p ersonnel held 
the key to the gate, wh ich could also be opened 
by a master key, h eld by Carrier employees, to 
locks on Carrier property. Carrier employees were 
no t permitted to use this gate to gain access to 
the Carrier plant. 
'311 F .2d a t 138. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid. 
BLocal 761 , Iot'l Union of Elec. Workers , .. 
NLRB, 366 U.S. 667, 674 (1961) . 
9 Koretz, Federal Regulation of Secondary 
Strikes and Boycotts - An.other Chapter, 59 
Colum. L. Rev. 125. 129 (1959) . 
10311 F .2d at 140. 
ll8S N.L.R.B. 417 (1949). 
12 Id. at 418. 
1887 N.L.R.B. 502, 505 (1949) . 
MSailors Union (Moore Dry Dock), 92 N.L.R .B. 
pick up an order of goods. The 
Court -stated that while the activity 
was geographically located at the 
primary employer's premises, this 
fact, while significant, is not neces-
sarily conclusive. However. the 
Court deemed the activity primary 
because there was " no ·suggestion 
that the union sought concerted con-
duct by ,such other employees."19 
"Although the Court's specific ratio 
decidendi in this case was not to 
survive the 1959 amendment of sec. 
8(b)(4) by which the requirement 
that concerted action be encouraged 
wa:s eliminated,20 its basic approach 
to ,the case wias to have a profound 
effect on subsequent constructions 
of . the statute."21 Geographical 
areas were no longer exempted from 
the operation of ,sec. 8(b}(4) . 
A determination of the legitima:cy 
of union activities in subsequen<t 
cases was to proceed on an examina-
tion of intent or objectives when 
neutra,ls were in danger of harm as 
a result of a union di·spute not ,their 
own. In the ·remaining three oa;ses of 
June 4, 1961 , Watson, Langer and 
Den,ver, the Board's finding below 
of a violation of ·sec. 8(b),(4) was 
affirmed. The Court emphasized <the 
centrality of the union's objectives.22 
"To find a violation of Se{!. 
8(b )( 4) it became sufficient bhat an 
objective of a union's actions was to 
interfere with business relations be-
tween the primary employer and 
neutral third parties."23 However, 
as Judge Prettyman recognized in 
Seafarers Int. Union v. NLRB,24 a 
union hopes, even if it does not ·so 
intend , that all persons including 
neutral employees will honor the 
picket line. Thus harm to neutral 
employers could be justified only if 
it occurred as an incidental effect 
of the union's pursuit of legitimate 
strike objectives. It remained ",(l) to 
identify the strike objectives which 
under the act were legitimate as 
distinguished from hoped-for resu1ts 
which if 1incidentally accomplished 
could be permissrble but which 
could not be independently pursued, 
and (2) ,to esta!blish evidentiary 
guidelines by which the true objec-
tives of union activity could be as-
cerba.ined . . . "25 
Board Decisions - 1952 to 1963 
Substantial progress was made in 
solving the two problems mentioned 
above during the second of the time 
periods. Concomitant with that 
progress the statute received broad-
er readings from the Board and the 
courts. The leading case of the peri-
od was Local 67, Brewery Workers 
(Washington Coca-Cola Bottling 
Works).26 There, the union picketed 
the premises of the :primary employ-
er and also picketed the company's 
trucks as they made their rounds to 
customers' premises. The Board held 
that the picketing of the tJrucks was 
a violation of sec. 8(b),(4). It dis-
tinguished this case ,from Schmtz 
and other prior ambulatory situs 
cases on t ,he ground that in the 
earlier cases the primary employer 
had no permanent place of business 
at which the union could adequately 
publicize its dispute. 
Thus, the "W,ashington Coca-Cola 
547 (1950) . 
1' Id . at 549. 
10 Denver Bldg. and Cons tr. Trades Council, 82 
N.L.R.B. 93 (1949); Local 501, Iot'l Bd. of 
Elec . Workers (Samuel. Langer) , 82 N.L.R .B. 
1028 (1949); Local 74. United Bd. of Carpenters 
(I. A. Wa1,oo Co .), 80 N.L.R.B. 533 (1948) . 
11341 U.S. 66S (1951) . 
1S International Brotherhood of Teamsters. 
19 341 u .s. al 671. 
!?O See statutes and text in note (2) supra. 
21311 F .2d at 142. 
22Local 74, United Bd. of Carpenters v. NLRB, 
341 U.S. 708 (1951); Local 501, lot'! Bd . of 
Elec. Worker, v. NLRB, 341 U.S. 694 (1957); 
NLRB v. Denver Bldg:. and Con,tr. Trades 
Council, 341 U.S. 675 (1951) . 
!!8 311 F .2d at 143. Senator Taft, sponsor of 
the bill, stated: "Sec tion 8(h) (4) . relating to 
illegal strikt::s and boycotts, was amended in 
conference b y striking out the words ' for the 
purpose of' and inserting the clause 'where an 
object thereof is.' " 93 Coog. Rec. 6859 (1947) . 
"'105 U .S.App.D.C. 211 (19S9) . 
26 311 F .2d at 143. 
Doctrine" in effect added to the 
four expressed in Moore Dry Dock 
a fifth condition: 
In order to justify picketing at 
neutiial premises it must be 
shown that there wa:s no reason-
able oppol"tunity for the union 
to attain its il:awful objectives 
by picketing the premises of the 
prima.ry employer .27 
"Although the 'Washington Coca-
Cola Doctrine' wa;s first developed 
in ambuia:tory situs cases, its ra-
tionale was extended to all cases 
threatening involvement of neutral 
employers and their employees. "28 
In Local 1017, Retail Fruit Clerks 
Union (Crystal Palace Mkt.) 29 the 
Board ~eld that the conduct of 
union members who chose to picket 
seven of the eleven entrances to a 
market hall in which the employer 
owned several stand,s instead of 
picketing at the site of each stand 
vio1ated sec. 8(b)(4). The Board 
noted: " In developing and applying 
these standards, the controlling oon-
sideration has ·been to require that 
t.he picketing be so con<luctoo as to 
minimize it •s impact on neutral em-
ployees insofar as this can be done 
without su!bstantial impairment of 
the effectiveness of the picketing and 
reaching the primary employees."30 
In Local, 861, lnt'l Bd. of Elec. 
Workers (Plauche Elec.)31 the Board 
modified the Washington Coca-Cola 
doctrine in its determination that it 
is "one circumstance, among others, 
in determining an object of the 
picketing."32 Despite modification 
the rationale enunciated in Wash-
ington Coca-Cola is dear; 
(1) 'I'he Supreme Court in-
sists that the gravamen of any 
complaint under ·sec. 8(b}(4) is 
a union's pursuit of a forbidden 
objective. 
(2) Legitimate objectives 
have been identified as "reach-
ing the primary employee ;":f3 
' publicizing its hbor <l i :pute in 
a traditional waJ· among em-
ployees primarily intere ted; '34 
communi•cating to employee of 
a primary employer its picket-
ing message."35 
(3) Neuitral employees can 
be involved only i:f incidental 
to the pursuit of a legitimate 
primary objective. 
(4) Picketing must be con-
ducted in such a way as to min-
imize its impact on neutral em-
ployees insofar ,as this can be 
done without substantially im-
pairing the effectiveness of the 
picketing in reaching the pri-
mary employees.36 
The application of these principles 
to the issue presented in Carrier 
Corp . wouM lead to but one conclu-
sion. "The union demonstrated that 
its manifest, ·and sole, objective was 
to induce or encourage railroad em-
ployees, or to coerce the railroad, to 
refuse to handle Carrier goods. Such 
results; although permissible when 
merely incidental to the pursuit of 
legitimate objectives,37 here m-
volved no such redemptive fea-
ture.38 
(Continued on Page 7) 
26 107 N.L.R.B. 299 (1953) , aff'd, 220 F .2d 380 
(D.C. Cir. 1955) . 
27NLRB v . Local 984, Teamsters Union, 251 
F .2d 494 (6th Cir. 1958); NLRB v. Loca.l 5246, 
United Steelworkers Union, 250 F .2d 184 (1st 
Cir. 1957); Local 659. Teamsters U nion (Ready 
Mixed Concrete Co. ), 116 N.L.R.B. 461, 473 
(l9S6) . 
""311 F .2d at 144. 
"116 N.L.R.B. 856 (1956) , aff'd, 249 F.2d 591 
(9th Cir. 1957) . 
""Id. at 858. 
ai135 N.L.R .B. 2SO (1961) . 
32 Id. at 254. 
""116 N .L.R.B. at 859. 
34 Local 659, Teamsters Un.ion (Ready Mixed 
Concrete Co.), 116 N.L.R.B. at 474. 
""Ibid. 
36 Di Giorgio Fruit Corp. v. NLRB, 191 F .2d 
642 (D.C. Cir. l9Sl) , 
ll7 Ibid. 
38 311 F .2d at 146. 
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Uncertain Status of Apportionment (Cont'd.) 
(Continued from Page 3) 
tistics alone: how many people re-
side in the various districts. A 
"rational basis" may be established 
by economic, geographical, historica,l 
factors, and so on. 
While the problem is not always 
described in ter:sms of respective bur-
dens of proof, this general approach 
is often taken by the courts. The 
greater the deviation from the 
population principle. the more com-
pelling must ,be the .re ons for uch 
deviation. Invidious discrimination 
i ahw1,ys the ultimate test; b\1 t om 
de. .. ree o.f di;;crim.ination or inequal-
it. can be explained away by a 
rational state policy. ''"hat devia-
tions are invidious and what policies 
are rational, of course, depends upon 
what the judge believes to be a 
violation of equal protection of the 
laws. 
2. "The federal pnnciple." 
The "federal principle" merely 
illustrates the bicameral division of 
the United States Congress. lit is 
also a rationalization for discrimi-
nation. At the Constitutional Con-
vention of 1787, some delegates 
demanded that representatives to the 
fedei:al legislature ,be elected by the 
people -according to their numbers. 
"No matter where he lived, each 
voter should have an equal voice 
with every other . .. . "34 Some dele-
gates objected that if population 
were the only basis of representation 
certain populous states could elect 
ufficient repre ·enta tives to wield 
overwhelming power in the govern-
ment. These delegates feared ma-
jorj ty nbjugation of the mino rit;v. 
T he <lIBpute w· re olved by the 
Great Compromise an d, ever since. 
United States Senators have been 
elected according to geography and 
Representatives ·according to popu-
lation. 
Many states have appar ently 
adopted the principle ia their own 
apportionment cheme. . and many 
lower courts have !riven it judicial 
sanction. One argument in favor of 
it proceeds on a 'whaf ·auce for 
the goose is -auce for th , gander' 
theory.31i If geogra,phlc classification 
is rational for the Federal govern-
ment, it is also rational for the State. 
This ar!rU.Drnat apparently ignores 
the hi torica.l context out of which 
the principle arose. It exists in the 
United States because certain dele-
gates threatened to withdraw from 
the Constitutional Convention if 
they did not get their way. Philo-
ophioally speaking, it may be high-
ly irrational, but it is with us 
nevertheless. 
Moreover, Senators represent dis-
tinct, in some respects, sovereign 
poli tical m1i ts \\ hose powers are 
rrnaranteed by th Federal Constitu-
tion. A county, on the other hand. 
i usually considered a govemm ntal 
aaency a convenient poli tical sub-
divis:ion, ordinarily " po ·e sing no 
power and ubj t to no duty uot 
originating Irom the law by which 
it is created . . . _''36 What is "good '. 
for the nation's citizenry as a whole 
living under a federal fom1 oI gov-
ernment pose far diife.rcnt economic, 
poli tical and legal problems than 
what i "good" 1or th• citizenry or 
an individual state. 
Lastly, questions of appo.rtionmeat 
are resolved in the light of the equal 
protection d au e. This dause does 
not refer to bicameralism. Its lan-
guage does not commend the federal 
••32 U.S.L. Week at 4144. 
35Maryland Committee for Fai r Representa . 
tion v. Tawes, supra at 719. 
36Sims v. Frink, 208 F. Supp. 431, 438 (M.D . 
Ala. 1962), appeal docketed sub nom., McCon . 
nell v. Frink, 32 U.S.L. Week 3015 (U.S. Nov. 
23, 1962) (No. 610, 1962 Term; renumbered 
No. 41, 1963 Term). 
"'220 F. Supp. 230 (N.D. Ill. 1963) , appeal 
docketed, 32 U.S.L. Week 3228 (U.S. Nov. 20, 
1963) (No. 636). 
""Id. at 235. 
39218 F. Supp. 953 (S.D. Ohio 1963), appeal 
docketed, 32 U.S.L. Week 3105 (U.S. Sept. 9, 
1963) (No. 454). 
'° Id. at 958. 
"32 U.S .L. Week 4142 (U.S. Feb. 17, 1964). 
<>220 F. Supp. 149 (W.D. Okla. 1963), ap-
peal docketed sub nom., Williams v. Moss. 32 
U.S.L. Week 3170 (U.S. Sept. 18, 1963) (No. 
476). 
e:x:ample. Nothing about it suggests 
that its interpreters, the judiciary, 
can or should distinguish between 
an upper and a lower house. 
A much better argument in favor 
of the federal principle emphasizes 
the necessity of preventing majority 
subjugation of minority interests. 
Supporters of this ,argument do not 
rely on the plain fact of federal 
bicameralism; they, instead, expound 
its under-lying rationalization. 
Consider two cases. In Germano 
v. Kerner,37 the lower house of the 
Illinois legislature was apportioned 
according to population, the upper 
house, or Senate, on a hasis that 
attempted to equalize the imbalance 
between rural and urban voters. The 
overall average population of sena-
torial districts was 174,000, the aver-
age in Chicago, 197,000, and in the 
remainder of Cook County exclud-
ing Chicago, 263,000. 29% of the 
voter·s could elect a senate majority. 
The Court approved the scheme, 
stating " this plan does in fact per-
mit a reasonable, not a capricious 
or absurd, check upon the political 
power of the largely populated 
urban area."38 
In Nolan v. Rhodes,39 each of 
Ohio's 88 counties was guaranteed 
at least one representative in the 
general assembly. The other branch 
of the legislature was apportioned 
according to population. The Court 
held, "The system is one of checks 
and ,balances designed to protect 
minority as well as majority inter-
ests, but with neither in control. 
Such an apportionment in our judg-
ment, cannot be said to be irra-
tional."40 
The judici,al standard thus formu-
lated follows as a conclusion from 
certain ipresumed premises. First, 
there does exist within the states a 
clear dichotomy of economic inter-
ests, i.e., industry vs. agriculture. 
Secondly, the majority group, repre-
senting one economic interest, will 
not do rpolitical justice to the 
minority. Thirdly, use of the ibi-
cameral system will adequately serve 
and safeguard majority interests as 
well as protect the minority. 
To the extent that these premises 
are valid, the argument carries much 
weight. The criticism, of course, is 
that the premises are factually in-
correct. Furthermore, in the finial 
analysis, any government is only as 
good as its individual personnel. A 
corrupt bunch of lawmakers can do 
the same harm in one situation as 
in the other. And finally, ,a system 
which permits minority veto accom-
plishes invidious discrimination just 
as effectively as an apportionment 
which creates numerical disparities 
of 19 and 8 to 1. In either case, the 
voter is denied the full exercise of 
his franchise. 
Consider, also, the implications of 
Wesberry v. Sanders,41 the congres-
sional reapportionment oase. If a 
state chooses to adopt the theory of 
the ifederal iprinciple, it must like-
wise adopt its practical requirement 
- strict numerical equality among 
districts of at least one branch of 
the legislature. Quaere however, 
with respect to the Senate side of 
the legislature: is a minimum of one 
or two representatives per county, 
whatever its size, population or 
economic peculiarities, rational ap-
portionment? 
3. The "practical equality stand-
ard" and geographical,, economic 
and historical rationalizations. 
The "practical equality standard" 
js synonymous with "the population. 
principle." It i · the antithesis of 
both invidious and rational discrimi-
nation. It requires apportionment on 
the basis of numbers of qualified 
voters without regard to any other 
factor, and it does not demand 
mathematical precision because that 
is impossible. 
In Moss v. Burkhart ,42 Okla-
homa's representative districts varied 
in population from 11 ,700 to 62,800 
and senate districts from 24,400 to 
115,300. 29% of the voters could 
elect a ·house majority. The Court 
decreed reapportionment "as near 
as may he to the equal number of 
inh~hitants in each district"43 and 
thereby applied the practical equal-
ity standard to both hmnches of the 
state legislature. 
In Sincock v. Duffy,44 Delaware's 
senatorial districts ranged from 
4,000 persons to approximately 
64,000 or a ratio of 16 to 1. 31 % of 
the voters could elect 2/3 of the 
senate, 28% were able to elect a 
majority of the house. The Court 
held that one of the two branches 
"must be apportioned on •an equal 
population basis as nearly as this 
can be accomplished .... "45 It also 
applied the practical equality stand-
ard. 
If most other courts reject the 
practical equality standard, either as 
to one or both legislative branches, 
they usually utilize it by way of in-
troduction and comparison. It is the 
touchstone for measuring deviations. 
Lisco v. Love46 discussed, rather 
comprehensively, geogr,aphic and 
economic factors as rational bases 
for deviations. The Court analyzed 
the Western, Eastern, South Cen-
tral and East slope regions of Colo-
rado in terms of elevation, tem-
perature, water supply, available 
railroads and highways, manufactur-
ing and agricultural production, 
mining, tourism and rpopulation. 
These "heterogenous characteris-
tics," the court said, "justify geo-
grruphical districting . . .. In no other 
way may representation be afforded 
to insular minorities."47 
But, geographic and economic 
factors are not plausible in and of 
themselves. They must first be crys-
tallized into the same protection of 
the minority argument offered in 
support of the federal principle. The 
argument has certain rational as-
pects as suggested above. But, again, 
as a logical conclusion, it rests on 
disputable premises. To the extent 
that substantial ,and fiercely antago-
nistic economic interests do not exist 
within a state, ,there cannot be any 
substantial disparity among voting 
interests. Furthermore, democratic 
government operates ;by majority 
decision. To over-protect insular 
minorities is to hamstring the ma-
jority, and thus the entire legislative 
process. 
The protagonists of the historical 
justification4 8 find support in a long 
series of constitutional or statutory 
reenactments. Where the basic pat-
tern of apportionment has remained 
uncha nged for numerous decades, as 
it often .has, how can it be arbitrary 
or capricious state policy? This 
argument uses semantics to avoid 
the true test- does the apportion-
ment invidiously discriminate among 
voters? If it does, then history, cus-
tom and tradition are immaterial. 
History may explain disparities; it 
may have created them. It certainly 
cannot justify them. 
4. The procedural standard. 
In Nolan v. Rhodes,49 the court 
said: 
Whenever the people of Ohio 
desire to change their constitu-
tion the way is wide open for 
them to do it .... [The fact that 
they have not indicates] rather 
clearly that the people in the 
counties in which plaintiffs re-
side . . . [do] not want any 
tampering with their constitu-
tion.50 
This statement was more than an 
offshoot of the historical justifica-
tion. The court seems to be saying 
that it will determine the validity 
of the alleged malapportionment in 
the light of available political reme-
dies. If plaintiffs and others similarly 
situated feel they are presently 
suffering a wrong, and if non-judicial, 
procedural recourse is available, let 
them seek it. ·Plaintiffs could have 
accomplished reappo11tionment either 
by initiative petition, requiring a 
majority of the voters, or by con-
stitutional convention, which a ma-
jority of the people had an auto-
matic right to call every twenty 
years. The fact that reapportionment 
had not been accomplished ,by these 
procedural means was apparently 
conclusive as to plaintiffs' cause of 
action. 
The court in Lisco v. Love5I took 
a much similar approach . In plain-
tiffs' first ,action,52 decided August 
10, 1962, invidious discrimination 
was found where 29.8% of the voters 
could elect a majority of the Sen-
ate, and 32.1 % a majority of the 
House. Final adjudication of the 
matter was postponed, however, 
pending voter approval of certain 
constitutional reapportionment 
measures to be submitted at the 
ensuing general election. House Dis-
tricts were to be apportioned on a 
strict population ·basis, and voters 
had the choice of apportioning Sen-
ate Distrids according to popula-
tion, or on an adjusted basis which 
would recognize a number of ra-
tional deviations. Voters approved 
the House measure, which was not 
contested in the second action, but 
they chose the adjusted method of 
Senate apportionment which still 
permitted 36.28% of the people to 
elect a majority. The issue in the 
second action, decided almost a year 
later, was the validity of this ad-
justed method of Senate apportion-
ment. The court upheld ~t stating, 
"We ,believe that no constitutional 
question arises as to the actual, sub-
stantive nature of apportionment if 
the popular will ha ei..'])re sed it-
se1f."G3 'TI ,the true test i the denial 
of equal right to due process, we 
face the traditional and recognized 
criteria of equal protection. 'l'hese 
are arbitiiariness, discrimination, and 
lack of .rationality. The actions of 
the electorate are material to the 
application of the criteria."54 (Em-
phasis added.) 
Lisco, th n, suggests a variation of 
the procedural standard announced 
in No/,an. The latter decision asks : 
Can the people express themselves?; 
the former: Have the people ex-
pressed themselves? One eminent 
author states that some sort of pro-
cedural standard is the only appro-
priate standard.55 Almost all other 
cases which deny reapportionment 
4.a Id. at 156. eral Assembly of Colorado, 32 U.S.L. Week McClosl.:y, The Supreme Cou.rt 1961 Term, 
"215 F . Supp. 169 (D. Del. 1963), appeal 3180 (U.S. Sept. 30, 1963) (No. 508). Foreword: The Reapportionment Case, 76 
docketed sub nom., Roman v. Sincock, 32 U .S .L. 5:ZLJsco v. McNichols, 208 F. Supp. 471 (D. HARV. L. REv. 54, 71 (1962). 
Week 3086 (U.S . July 25, 1963) (No. 3o7) • Colo. 1962). S6Tennessee's legislature consis tently ignored 
'
5 
Id. at 189. G3Lisco v. Love, supra, note 51 at 933 , a constitutional directive to reapportion every 46 219 F. Supp. 922 (D. Colo. 1963) , appeal MJd. at 932. ten years. Such blatant malfeasance on the part 
docketed sub nom.., Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen-
55 
of the legislature may have been important to 
eral Assembly of Colorado, 32 U .S.L. Week 3180 the court in reaching its determination, hut it 
(U.S. Sept. 30, 1963), (No. 508) . If there has been a significant passage of is difficult to see what logical connection Jegis -
4.7 Id. at 932. time since the last constituent decision on lative malfeasance has with invidious discrim-
"E.g., W.M .C.A. v. Simon, 208 F. Supp. 368 
(S.D. N.Y. 1962), appeal docketed, 32 U.S.L. 
Week 3266 (U.S. Sept. 26, 1962) (No. 460, 1962 
Term; renumbered No. 20, 1963 Term). 
.. 218 F. Supp. 953, (S.D. Ohio 1963), appeal 
docketed, 32 U.S.L. Week 3105 (U.S. Sept. 9, 
1963) (No. 454) . 
so Id. at 958. 
51 219 F. Supp. 922 (D. Colo. 1963), appeal 
docketed sub nom., Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen-
apportionment, and if population shifts in 
the interval have substantially altered the 
distribution of legislative seats, and if the 
channels of popular acces!!I to the issue 
are ob!!ltructed, the present apportionment 
might be held to violate the fourteenth 
amendment. But n o constitutional question 
could be raised as to the actual, sub-
stantive nature of the apportionment if 
the popular will had expressed itself or 
possessed adequate means for doing so. 
ination per se. 
57 The purest form of voter equality would 
be at•large elections. The courts, however, 
have r efrained from even threatening such ac, 
tion, much less actually ordering it. 
58 
The court has been particularly unwilling 
to intervene in matters concerning the struc-
ture and organization of the p olitical insti-
tutions of the states. The abstention from 
find that political remedies, such as 
the initiative or referendum, are 
readily available. Baker v. Carr it-. 
self may be authority for validity 
of the standard.56 
Just how valid this standard may 
be, however, is subject to ,erious 
scrutiny. First, it should be remem-
bered that Nolan also approved a 
system which sought to protect 
minority interests. Protection of 
minority interests is the underlying 
rationalization for the deviations in 
Li.sea. If invidious discrimination 
exists among legislative districts, and 
if the majority can take procedural 
steps to perpetuate such discrimina-
tion, what minority protection is 
thereby accomplished. Suppose in an 
extreme eX!ample the entire non-
Twin City population of Minnesota 
voted to ,allocate 90% of the Sen-
ate seats to rural districts. Would 
that ·be rational apportionment? Or, 
suppose voters vote "No," to reap-
portionment because they do not 
approve the proposed method, or 
simply because they do not under-
stand it. Invidious discrimination 
may be perpetuated by mistake as 
well as ,by conscious action . 
Secondly, if the right to equal 
protection of the laws is derived 
from the United States Constitu-
tion, as the courts must admit, then 
a fortiori it is judicially guaranteed 
and cannot be made to depend on 
the will of the majority. The right 
to equal protection of the laws is 
akin to the rights of freedom of re-
ligion and freedom of speech. What-
ever reasonable limitations may be 
imposed upon its exercise, its exist-
ence oannot be determined at the 
ballot ·box. For these reasons, judi-
cial inquiry should never reach the 
issue of the availability of political 
remedies, nor should it be concerned 
with the fact that voters have re-
cently approved or disapproved 
some constitutional amendment. 
With all due respect to the genius 
of federal district court and state 
supreme court judges, the so-called 
"procedural ·standard" does not be-
long in an apportionment case. 
5. Remedies. 
Once a comt ·takes jurisdiction 
and adjudicates in plaintiff's favor, 
it must answer the further and fair-
ly difficult question of " rh:ich remedy, 
if any, should be granted. Va rious 
courts have reacted differently to 
thi- problem and, a might be e) ·-
_pec ted, the deci io= do not nearly 
reflect the full ran o-e of rpossibiliti . 
Every successful plaintiff, of 
course, obtains a declaratory judg-
ment invalidating the present ap-
portionment scheme. If the judg-
ment is to have any practical ef-
fect, the court must also enjoin 
further elections under the law it 
declared invalid, and undertake in 
some fashion to effectuate a reap-
portionment which it considers con-
stitutio'nal.57 
Legislative apportionment is ,tra-
ditionally a state's prerogative,58 so 
the courts have been quite willing 
to permit defendants an opportunity 
to accomplish reapportionment 
themselves provided ,they act with-
in a stiipulated59 or reasonable60 
period of time. Where it is appar-
ent that defendants will not or can-
not act, the court may grant reap-
portionment by judici,al decree.SI 
Whether or not a Federal District 
Court is empowered to decree reap-
(Continued on Page 6) 
judicial entry into s uch areas has been 
greater even than that whiCh marks the 
court's ordinary approach to issues of state 
power challenged under broad federal guar , 
aotees. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 284, 
Justice Frankfurter dissenting. 
39 E.g., Scholle v. Hare, 367 Mich . 176, 1!6 
N.W.2d 350 (1962), cert. granted sub nom. 
Beadle v. Scholle, 32 U.S.L. Week 3266 (U.S. 
Nov. 23, 1962) (No. 610, 1962 Term; renum-
bered No. 23, 1963 Term). 
'° E.g., Sims v. Frink, 208 F. Supp. 431, (M.D. 
Ala. 1962) , appeal docketed .sub nom., McCon-
nell v. Frink, 32 U.S.L . Week 3266 (U.S. Nov. 
23, 1962) (No. 610, 1962 Term; renumbered 
No. 23, 1963 Term). 
"1E.g., Moss v. Burkhart, 220 F. Supp. 149 
(W.D. Okla. 1963), appeal docketed sub nom., 
Williams v. Moss, 32 U.S.L. Week 3170 (U.S. 
Sept. 19, 1963) (No. 476). 
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Sheran Law 
Day Speaker 
DEFENDER SYSTEM STUDIED 
by John E. McKendrick true, at least in Minne-SOta. He notes that the State has had some provi-
sion for the appomtmen.t of counsel in_ "'ielony and gross mi demeanor 
ca.ses .. since 1869. And in Hennepin a.nd Ramsey Counties, where approxi-
mately 90% of such criminal cases originate highly efficient Public 
Defender ,systems ha.ve functioned for many yea.rs. 
by Gary Phleger 
This year's theme for Law Day 
is "Observe the Law - Key to Or-
der, Justice, Freedom." Friday, May 
l , 1964, was the ,seventh annual 
observance of Law Day since its 
establishment hy P.resi<lential proc-
lamation in 1958. 
Recently, at t he request of Chief J ustice Oscar Knutson of the Min-
nesota upreme Court, a Special Committee of the tate Bar. sociation 
~-as formed to investi,giate the :problem of post-ronviction remedie and 
appeals fo r indigent prisoner" ,in Mmnesoba. and to- m-ake posi.tive recom-
men<la.tions based on the finding , 
The request of the Chief J ustice wa-s predicated on the national furor 
created by the 1963 United tat.es upreme Court decis.ion in Gideon ''-' · 
Wainwright, which declared that to ati fy the requirement" of due 
process an impo erished defendmt (at least in felonv prosecutions) ha 
the night to ,assistance of counsel a.t all stages of the proceeding again t 
him. This holding has caused consternation in most state courts, because 
it is possible that many presently inca.rcerated felons may ha,-e been 
denied proper counsel and must consequently be se free. The present 
committee, c."Onsi"ting of 0 1 members, w:as ,thu created to scrutinize the 
ex:isting P ublic D efender ,system .in I\Iinnesota. 
Bolstering thi conclusion is the fact tba.t of the first 70 application 
for rewew of their conviction made by prisoners from Stillwater in tbe 
wake of the Gideon case, the J\finnesota Supreme Court determined that 
none had any merit. 
Despite Minnesota's fine record in this regard the committee now 
close to completing it s work, has drafted .a bill directed toward remedy-
ing any unsolved problems on the ubject of indigent prisoner . Before 
passage into law, however the b ill mu t fust ga,in acceptance by the 
tate Bar Association -and must then undergo a severe screening by the 
tate Legislature. 
Justice Robert J. Sheran of the 
Supreme Court of Minnesota spoke 
on "Liberty an<l the Law" to stu-
deni:6 and thei'l" wives at William 
Mitchell College of Law as a part 
of the school's annual observance 
of Law Day. Justice Sheran is the 
newest member of the Minnesota 
Supreme Court, having been ap-
pointed to the bench in January, 
1963. He was a practicing attorney 
for eig,hteen years in the Mankato, 
Minnesota, area, with the firm of 
Gallagher, Farrish, SheJ.1an and Zim-
merman. Justice Sheran is also a 
membe'l" of the William Mitchell 
Moot Court Staff. 
Judge Donald F. Barbeau of the Hennepin County District Court was 
appointed to head Ole committee. Joining him are many prominent mem-
ber of the State Judiciary and Bar including both Chi f Ju tice Knut-
son and Justice Robert Sheran. of the upreme Court J udge Ario 
H eari.ng oI Waconia, Dean tepb.en R. Curtis o[ the William Mitchell 
College of L aw, and Y,ale Kamisar, noted criminal law professol' of the 
University of Minnesota Law School. 
The primary innovation in the 'Proposed bill is that i t e tahlis:he a 
sw,Lewide Public Defender Office which woul<l s1,rpervise similar offices 
in each of Minnesota' ten judicial districts. Each D i,skict Oflice would 
then rb allotted a given numw of personnel together with a designated 
salary _for uch. personnel. 
Remaining esse,ntially untouohed by ,the bill are the Public Defender 
-ystem in rt.he metropolitan districts. The change , if pa. ed by the 
Legislature, would effect only the outlying districts an.d would integro:te 
them mto the tatewide office. On the subject of _final pa sage Judcre 
Barbeau foresees some difficulty with the L egislature, because the bill 
requires a relati.ely large arpproptiation of public funds . 
Although the e.-usteu.ce of the committee might suggest to some that 
a serious problem exist:s Jud,ge Barbeau ~tates that just the opposite is 
In addition to Justice Sheran's 
talk, Michael George, a member of 
Explorer Scout Tmop No. 438, pre-
sented a talk on the subject of 
"What Law Means to Me." This 
troop, sponsored by the Ramsey 
County Bar Association, is made up 
of boys who p1an to study law. Their 
adw,sor is Gerald C. Rummel, a 1960 
graduate of William Mitchell. 
Baker v. Carr 
apply is human rights and the areas 
upon which they encroach are po-
litical in nature. Every comm ntator 
and every court deci-sion,65 includ-
ing Baker, ei,ther suggests or holds 
that deviations from the popula-
tion principle may be permitted in 
at lea.st one of the two legislative 
branches. It is here submitted that 
this is a proper -standard, that one 
house must be apportioned after 
the federal principle, ",as near as 
(Continued from Page 5) may be" to equal population, and 
tha.t if the other is not so appor-
portionment, and, if so, what limita- tioned, the state's economy must be 
tions attach to this power, are spe- characterized by substantial and 
cific issues presently before the Su- conflicting minority interests. Nu-
preme Court.62 To the extent that merical equality must be the rule; 
such positive remedies are unavail- any deviation therefrom must be 
able, however, plaintiff's cause of rationalized by the likelihood of 
action may be more illusory ,than majority subjugation of the minor-
real. T!he :6act that the Supreme ity. The courra should receive evi-
C<ourt went as far as it did in Baker dence of economrc factors, but be-
v. Carr hardly suggests that it will cause they are the sole arbiters of 
draw rthe line a.t mandatory injunc- equal :protection claims, evidence of 
tions.63 the popular will should be disre-
Conclusion garded in toto. F inally since legis-
Any attempt to anticipate any Jators are better equipped to a.na-
ordinary Supreme Court decision re- lyze minority needs, the state 
quires a curious admixture of rea- itself should be given ample oppor-
son, precedent and educated specu- tunity to formulate its own consti-
lation. Any attempt to project Baker tutional reapportionment. The threat 
v. Carr permits of little more than of judicial reapportionment must 
pure conjecture. T,he ;preceding dis- not, however, be meanin~ess. Upon 
cussion has been addressed to a sur- reviewing all the facts relevant to 
prisingly widespread and perplexing the extent of, and rationalizations 
problem. According to recent -statis- for, rpopulation disparities, the courts 
tics64 the representative majorities U1emselves must be prepared ,to im-
of the Upper Houses in 31 state plement the precepts of the Con-
legislatures a.re elected by less than stitution with binding force and 
35% of ,the voters. The majorities authority. 
in all ibut 10 Lower Houses are--- - --- - --- ---
elected by 40% of the voters or 
less-mostly far less. Baker v . Carr 
struck ,the first blow at this problem, 
but its victim, invidious discrimina-
tion, will not be seriously disabled 
until the court becomes definitive 
in its delineation of judicial stand-
ards. 
The standaro,s must necessarily be 
broad an<l flexible, at least initially, 
for the subject matter to which they 
62 See "S ubject Matter Summary of Cases Re-
cently Filed", No. 476, Williams v. Moss, 32 
U.S.L. Week 3170. 
IR:l,Or , as the cot:irt s:Dld in Moss v . Burkhart, 
220 F. Supp. 149, lS5 (W.D. Okla. 1963), ~ppcol 
docketed sub nom.1 ilUams v. Moaa, 32 U.S.t.. 
Week 3170 [U.S. Sept. 18, 1963 (No. 476) , 
uwe shall p:-rocetd on the fu mJnme.ntal premhe 
that equity i5 oc_\•er impotent or iodolmu before 
the law." 
MGoldberg, Th e Statis tics of Malapport ion-
ment, 72 Yale L.J. 90, 100-101 (1962). 
65Moss v . Burkhart may he the one exception. 
See footnote 42 and accompanying text. 
Dicta by the Dean 
(Continued from Page 2 ) 
We would hope to arrange for visits to courthouse offices and an intro-
d uction t o ilheir procedures. lnstmction would be hy faculty member , 
practicing Jawyers, judges and government a.clm:inistrator . Wisconsin_ has 
a ,system of required apprenticeship but pemnits the taking as an a.it~ 
tive of a cou~ similar :to the JProgram we are considering. 
T,he Commencement program for the evening of J une 9 will be inter-
esting and notable. Witlh men taking part such as United States Circuit 
Judges Burger and :Blaekmun, wbo grew up together in S.t. P aul, and 
l\fr. William J\1Iitche1l of Washington, wih.o is the ,grand on of t he famou 
justice a.fter whom our school was named, thi will be an occasion to be 
remembered. 
Our Board of Tuustees is ma.king a careful oa.nvass m its search for a 
dean. One very fortunate development ha.s occurred in fiUing the place 
of -office manager and secretary, which is ibeing \•aca.ted by Mr . Cur-
tis. When we asked Mi Greiner, the very efficient Managing Editor of 
the Bench and B ar, i£ she could suggest someone, her response was that 
she might ,be intere.,,.-ted herself. We a.re delighted and relieved to an-
nounce that Miss Greiner will join the 'School' ..staff -as ,soon as the State 
Bar convention is over m June. 
To -the many alumni :and other friends whom I may not be able to ee 
before leaving I expre - a most sincere thank you for your many cour-
tesies and a heartfelt au revoir. 
BOOK REVIEW 
Carlin Presents Problems of 
Individual Practitioners 
by John E. McKendrick 
This 234 page book represents a study by the 
author of the background working habits prob-
1ems and frustration of ahnQst 100 individual 
practitioners in the city of Chicago. The study 
was conducted by means of personal interview , 
in 1957. Afthough the number of lawyer inter-
viewed i small, it may be said that their wndom 
election r pre ents a fair cro s-section, in that the 
author has treated at length almost every conceiv-
able "egment of private practice using the par-
ticipant' own words to describe hi eiq)eriences 
and impression . 
A ·the a-uthor unfolds hi story of this special 
type of lawyer it become a_pparent quite early 
that he ha arrived at a two-sided premi e. On 
one side i the fact tbaL the individual practi-
tioner populates the lower strata of the metropoli-
tan bar, both in respect to prestige and in re-
spect to wealth. But the individual practitioner's 
p)iaht ha had a. seesaw effect on the makeup 
of the bar, for as he ha- declined in prominence 
from the respected position be once held, there 
h_a been a corre ·ponding ascent in the pro.m-
ine11c of the large city law finn with its staff of 
experts. Thus, the other side of the coin is that 
the "elite" of the metropolitan bar is now com-
prised o:f the members of the large law fu:m-. 
, vhile the reasons for this tra.n ition are many 
a.nd varied the l:listorical cause i not difficult to 
comprehend. As our indu ttial economy .has 
grown so ha the "giant corporation " witl1 it 
ever increasing comple..--i ties. And as the author 
points out, ''bigness' is precisely the problem. 
The individual practitioner is, as a rule simply in-
capable of .handling the intricate problems and 
specialized thinking that are more and more de-
manded of ihim. 
This has not only resulted in the individual 
practitioner losing the best clients from the most 
respected field~ such as corporate work and estate 
planning, but has also in turn loaded him with 
I.he burden or dispatching the more undesirable 
tasks dispensed to the legal profess.ion : the divorce 
a lawyer . 
What is the answer? The author propo es a 
change in_ the attitude displayed by the 'elite" 
of the metropolitan bar, the members of the large 
fu:m who control the functioning of the profos-
sion. He suggests that much of the unwillingness 
to consider the small pract itioner, and to look 
out for hi interests, is due to a fear: that the large 
law firms will lose the exalted _position they were 
so long in acquiring. But at the same time, he 
i aware t hat the age in which we liv represents 
the most complex social order in history, and 
that with. an understanding of this fact goes the 
knowledge tha.t no one man can ever hope to 
master it all. T he age when a lawyer could handle 
everybody 's problems, large and small, lliis passed. 
It must be acknowledged that this book p re-
·ents a straightforward and lucid description of 
one of the most pre~sing problems confronting 
the bar associations in our larger metropolitan 
communities. Certainly, the general manner in. 
which the autho'r ha.s p re ented the problem 
would uggest that Chicago does n ot represent 
a pecial case bu.t a typical one. Still, while ex-
ternal changes and tbe course of history have con-
tributed mightily to the current frustrations ex-
perienced by the private p ractitioner . it would 
seem that Mr. Catlin has but lightly considered 
a more subtle explanation for ru.s shortcoming", 
one which perhaps may be found in hi very na-
ture and certainly which may be found in any 
profession or haphazard grouping of individuals. 
He alludes to it a one point: 
"In short then, most individual practi-
tioners in the metropolitan bar a.re men 
of fairly high ambition who haven't 
made it, and try as the~, may they can-
not rationalize that fact away." 
and impressions. T o bolster hi conclus:ion.s and 
ob ervation , l.\fr. Carlin has made liberal u e of 
tables and statistics at the conclusion of each 
chapter which, if notbincr else lend !ITaphic sup-
port to hi attempt to define the essence of the 
inclividuaJ practitioner. 
pecialized thinking that is more and m ore de-
manded of him. For tbi is the age or the expert, 
and rare i the private practitioner who is an ex-
pert, unless he does specialize. 
It is a basic tLx:iom that the more comple.x a legal 
problem, the- more money will be ,offered for it 
ol ution. And becaus it i:s readily apparent that 
the larue law firm b.ave managed to taff them-
elve,s w:ith mo t or the available expert needed 
to olve such prob1ems it nece sruily follow that 
L.b,e mo t lucrative bu iness in each branch of 
the practice of law has found its way into the of-
fices 01 the prestige-laden large law finns. 
lection, and so forth. In many of these area.s, little 
or no skill is required and, where it is, the com-
mon procedur e is to farm out the problem to an 
expert. In this capacity, the individual practi-
t ioner is es entiall ' acting ~s a broker rather than 
a Ja~ryer. Mr. Carlin reaches the conclusion that 
unfortunately the "farmino--out of his practice' 
i the rule rather than the exception. 
In a number of cases, it -i- uggested tha.t the 
Jack of skill or apparent lack of it on the part 
of the individual p ractitioner may be the product 
of a general lack of initiative. But the author de-
termines that in the majority of case the fault 
may be traced to his legal background. That back-
ground is predommantly a product of the night 
la."· schools of the '>O' and 30's which, by any 
evaluation, maintained notoriously poor stand-
a rc:Ls . I t is a brutal fact t o the individuals from 
these schools that when they beg'(l.n to comp te 
with gr.i.duates from the accredited law schools, 
they more often than not came out on the shor t 
end. 
One additional and increasingly important rea-
son advanced for the decline of the individual 
practitioner is the in.roads made on the legal pro-
fession by lay group , predominant of which are 
the brokers and savings and loan associations in 
the real estate field. Unques·tionably thi has de-
prived lawyer- of a -ub ta.ntial source of busines 
that they traditionally held. and, although Mr. 
Carlin feels that there is room to be made for 
these lay groups in the performance of essen-
tially clerical ·tasks he recognizes that the devel-
opment ha placed the individual Jawyer in a 
most precarious economic position. 
Lawyers on Their Own: A StlUl,y of I-n4,i-vid-ual 
Practitimi.ers in Chicago; by Jerome E . Carlin; 
1962: Ri£tgers University Press. 
J 
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FACULTY SKETCH 
Johnson Specialist in 
Corporate Tax Field 
Eighth Circuit Mourns 
Death of John Sanborn 
by R. W. Rahn 
Mr. Robert J. Johnson, who 
tea~hes parts of the third year 
course in taxation, particularly cor-
porate tax.matters, comes well quail-
ified to imput ,tax knowledge to our 
students. He is a partner in the Min-
,-,-~-.- neaipolis law firm of 
istration, graduating in 1947 with 
di,stinction. Finally, he attended the 
University of Minnesota Law School, 
for hrs LL.B. with honors and as a 
member of the Order of the Coif in 
1949. 
His first employment was with the 
Minneapoli•s law firm then ,known 
as Dorsey, Coleman, Barker, Scott 
& Barber, where he has remained 
1:'hrough its several changes in name. 
He also served in the United States 
Navy, spending 32 months aboard 
a destroyer-minesweeper m the 
Pacific. 
by Kenneth Mitchell 
On March 7, 1964 at 3: 15 a.m. 
the Rrght Honorable Judge John B. 
Sanborn, Senior Jurist for the 8th 
Circuit, died at Miller Hospital in 
St. Paul. To list all of the activities 
of a man who ·began his career of 
public service in 1913 and his judi-
cial career in 1922 would require 
more space than can be provided 
here. His Circuit Court of Appeals 
opinions alone (1932-1963) run well 
over 900. 
Judge Sanborn's contri'.bution,s to 
leg,al education are also well known. 
He was trustee of the St. Paul Col-
Dorsey, Owen, 
Marquart, Wind-
horst ,& West, where 
his fields of special-
ization include both 
taxation and cor-
porate mel'gers and 
reorganizations. He 
has .been teachiil'g 
the tax course at 
He is kept quite busy with his 
practice and the hour,s he devotes 
to professional meetings and other 
activities. In agreement with many 
other successful attorneys, Mr. John-
son points out that students are de-
ceiving themselves if they look for-
waro to actua:l practice anticipa;ting 
a respite from their klibor,s. He 
hastens to add, however, that the 
amount of time spent is amply re-
warded by the .satisfaction an at-
torney derives froon the challenging 
type of work. he does. Mr. Johnson 
is often obliged to put in evening 
and weekend hours, whioh ,seems to 
be the lot of any attorney w1h.o 
hopes to do his job well, ibut he 
feel,s these are often his most pro-
d ucti ve hours, the times when 'he 
can really concentrate on his work, 
undi:stutbed. 
* * * * * * *------
Johnson 
WillillJill Mitchell since 1955, and be-
fore that he taught ,accounting at 
the University of Minnesota Busi-
ness School. He has written articles 
for publication in the Minnesota 
Law Review and in various tax 
periodicals. He is past chairman of 
the Hennepin County Bar Tax Sec-
tion, and is now chairman of the 
Minnesota Bar Tax Section. 
Born and raised in south Minne-
apolis, he attended Roosevelt High 
School. He went on to the College 
of St. Th=s, where he received a 
Bachelor of Arts degree summa cum 
laude in 1943, and then bhe Harvard 
Business School, where he earned a 
Masters degree in Business Admin-
To say that John Sanborn is a quiet and kind man of 
culture who has unwaveringly pradiced the principles 
of honor, truth, integrity and fairness is but to recount 
the most obvious of his virtues. Nor may explanation of 
his stature be completed by acknowledging the great 
depth of his wisdom, the keenness of his analytical and 
inquiring mind, the soundness of his judgment and his 
mastery of the law, or even by recognizing, in addition, 
his constant quest for truth and, when found, his fear-
less declaration of it whether popular or not. For any 
true appraisal of Judge Sanborn's stature must include 
two other qualities - humbleness and simplicity - even 
if they only blended with and added luster to those 
mentioned heretofore. 
Charles E. Whittaker 
former Associate Justice, 
Supreme Court 
of the United States 
44 MINN. L. REV. 197 
Primary vs. Secondary Picketing 
(Continued from Page 4) unoffending employer, bore n o that Congress did not intend to 
These ;principles tha.ve aJso served more adve e eJfect t'ha.n_ i t would rui,ve the statute intei,preted liter-
as ,guideline for the court of ap- h1H·e ' ufiered had jL \)eeu workin" ally. T he problem, then, is how far 
peals \'l'hen the. picketing of neutral on t:he ship at a dock owned by (the Con.gre intended the Borurd mid 
or secondary premises ~ •been ~t pl"imary Employer) . . . veral mile the court · hould go in the interpre-
i;;;sue.ll!> away ruid had the picketing 'been tation of the mtute. It i my op:n-
Tl)e "separate ,gate' cases have at that dock. If uch ha,d been the jon t hat tlhe deci·ions ha.,·e followed 
also been u!bject to the rprinciples case, Todd emrployee would ba.ve a piittem Congress might well _have 
m entioned. Tlhu:s, in United, Steel- refused to cross the line in order to antic.ipa.ted. It would b extremely 
·worla:rs v. J\TLRB<lO t he cou r t. work on the ,(ship}. uch picketing difficult to cover all situations in tl1e 
.adopted the following standard wouild widoubtedly have been le- area of ,picketing under a inale stat-
which woultl. render picketing law- gaJ."-1S The cou,r t then reasoned ute. Co)"l quentl~· Congress ha ait-
ful: "There must be a separate gate that since the effect would 'be the tempted to t up the guidelines for 
marked iand set apart from other sa,me, picketing in both location use by the Boar,d ~d the courts in 
_g,ate; the work done by the men would ibe lawful. the f.o:rm of ec. S(b){-.l:). The Boai:d 
,...-ho use the g:ate must be umelated The majority · ubmits that t.he and the court mmst Ira.me the many 
to the normal operations of the em- crucial ,lallac in this a.rrumeut is situations with which they are pTe-
ployer and the woi,k must be of a ~e ~ailure of the di se~! to dis- seuted ,vit?ID tl~e:se ~delines and 
kind that would not, iI done when tmgmsh bet.·ween fully legitimate oh- render theu- decision m a manner 
he pla.nt were engaged m its regu- jec~ives and those ~OJ:!Cd-.for results wilii~ will bot~ sa.ti-fy th purpose 
Jar operations necessitate curtail- wlricli a.re 11ot pe.nnissi.ble unle in- and rntent behina t he statute and 
in<> those ope.ration . .u cidentally achieved. "Because a allo"W the employer and employe s 
n· ent harm may be permitted in one in- full latitude in equita:bly ettliug 
m1.. di +; n.~s~lDJ. -
0 
· b- __ ,1 on tance only because incidental to t:heir labor disputes. 
.1.'ile en'-'-'-'15 -i· n JS ...,,.,.,. ,__..L. ., . . · · · fa.llao" 
an argument the majority contends iaw!w iactivities, rt is iou rea- NOTE: i1bsequent to the prepru,a,. 
is ftaJlacious. The gi·st of the a.rgu- orung to hold _that ~e s,,me ~ tion and completion of thi paper, 
ment is that in Carrier the em- m'\ll.St be pe.nm~ec! ~ another m- the United tates upreme Court 
plovees 1JllMe no attempt to in ter- stance "' here it ts mdependently er.ranted certiorari :For review of th 
fere with any of the railroads opera- pm-ued.'"'A . . . decision of the Court of Appeal · 
tions for plants otiher than Can-ier. . Judge Lumbard m wn~ . the On Iarch "2S, 1964, th up,reme 
'Dhe xailroad employees -were not di ~t, <:°ntends that the ma.Jori~ Court :rever eel the <leciision~6 hoJd-
e::tcolU'aged, nor did they refu'se to ~ 1~ 011 l'S b~ed on -a TI?e_,spun _drs- ing -that it is not unfair labor prac-
serve the other plants. The picket- t~nctJ~n havm~ no iba,si,s in leg; ]4:1,- tie £or union to picket entNJ.nce 
ing wa designed to accomplish no t:Jve ilu t~rr. or ~ reason. 'What ~: u ed exclusively by .railroad person-
more than picketing outside one of alleged dis~ction comes d~wn to 1_"' nel, to railroad spur t11aek located on_ 
Carrier's o~rn de.livery entrance that the uruon can ,seek to ~uence .right-of-way owned_ ,by railroad bu.t 
zni.,.bt have accomplished. neutr~ employees at the pr=ses oi adjacent to struck employer' prem-
In support of i view the dissent tbe prnuar_y e~plo~er and not el e- i e-. 
refers to t.h.e courts holding in Sea- wber_e (whi~ tn this ca.se ~~ ' of ".Picketing bas traditionally been 
farer;· Intl ni.on u. J\ LRB . .J;J The ~UT e, that it ~not use pickets to a major weapon to implement the 
fa.ct,s of that rose are essentially as mflueuc~ the railroad workers at all) . goa.]s of a b:ike and has character-
follows: A hip owned by the pri- B11'.t ~ .~es ;the test no.t the istically been iaimed at all those ap-
mary employer ""as undergoing re- umon. 5 ob~ective ,but th~ location of proach.ing the situ- who e mission i 
pair in a .shipyard on neutral J}rem- ~~ 'P1~_ebng; a . test which the ~!; elling, delivering or otherwise eon-
ises. The union employees of tihe pri- Jonty it.selfadmi to be obsolete. trihutinlli to the operatio~ which 
maTy employer picketed ou ide the Conclusion the strike js endeavoring to halt. In 
gates of the ya.rd foi: & week afte.r we have seen, bhe shift from light of this traditional goal of pri-
a]I non- upct~ · ory per onnel had primar -secon<lary activity based on ma.ry pressures we think Congres 
been removed from the ship. As ~ a geographlcal clistinotion to a con- intended to pre...o:er e ·the rjght to 
result, the neutral employe re:ftrsed_ side:ration 0£ lawmtl objectives oos picket during a strike a gate re-
to work on the -ship of the primary resulted in much litig.,!tion. The erved for employees of neutral de-
employer. The Board held that the Boll!Td an.cl the cowts are faced with livery men furn~shing day-to-clay 
union had violated sec. S(b }{ 4). problems in w'hich they roust weigh service essentia,l to the employei-' 
However the Court of Appeals for the right o& the employees to pub- regular operation ."47 
th.e Di trict of Columbia Circuit re- licize their dispute to fcllow em- The location ol the picketing, 
versed, holding that ttihe effect of the ployees ,against the right of mana:ge- though important, is not deemed of 
trike on the neutral employees wias ment t o be free of pres~ure and co- decisi, e igni:fica.nce. The legality of 
ooly incidental to a la.wiul strike ercio.n which migh:t be exerted iby separate gate p icketing depends 
a.,,<1fill1St the p rimary employer. The neutral employers and employee . upon the type of work being pe:r-
court there said: "Here Todd the There eems to be little douibt ibut formed by the employee~ who use 
that gate. IE the duties of the em-
ployees iare connecte<l ·wit-b the day-
to-day operations 0£ the employer, 
picketing directed at them is pro-
tected and the objective of the 
union will be considered law.fol. 
The uprem e Court then deter-
mined that for the purposes of ec. 
8(b) (4} picketing ~t a. gate situated 
on railroad property was at ~~ situs 
so proximate and related to the em-
ployer's day-to-day operation tbat it 
is no more unlawful than if it had 
o •curred at a gate owned by Car-
rier orp. 
In umrnat.r, th~ up:reme Court 
agrees with the ,amtlysis of the de-
n !!Jopment of case Jaw in the ar a 
of picketii1g as set forth in the 
majority opinion in the Court of 
ppcals. However becau ·e of its 
determina.tiou that the picketing was 
lawful prin1a.ry activ ity when con-
ducted at a situ so proximate and 
rehited to the employer_'· da) -to-
day operations, it disa,,arees with the 
finding of the Court of.Appeals that 
th picketing wa condar · activity 
when performed on the premises of 
a secondary employer and hence 
could not be cousidered incidental 
to lawful primary picketing. 
Mr. Justice White deli ered the 
opinion oi the Couxt. 
"'Sec. <.g •• J\'LRB ~·. Onited Steelworker> of 
Amu,ica, 250 F.2d l84 (ht Cir. J95i); NLRB v. 
L<>eal Union 91H. Driver, , 2Sl F.2d 49,1 61b_ 
Cit. 1958) ; Browe;r and Beverage Tirh•c,s Un:io1L 
• · NLRB, 220 F.!?d 380 (D.C . Cir. 19.iS); NLRB 
•. Loclll. 802, ·soc. Mu.oiciollJI, 226 F .2d 900 
(2d Cir. 1955 ; Burr ,. NLRB, 321 F .2d 6l 2 
(5th Cir. 1963 • t11 tlio Burr .... 1ho Court 
hold Lh.u.1- pi.n.kcting Cn.tr4.nC.e!. o.( o.autral :r:ieta:il 
J w:nitu.rc liltoru T~fuiin[r 10 o1r:citde 10 u.niQ11~1 ,de. 
m:rnd to ceue. h.mdl.in; produ~~ cf prhna:ry 
umplo ·er whh whom wtlon hn.d a. dispute ---wus 
unfair b.bor pra.aric.e within tb.c mc.:t.Din; of StJe. 
8(b) (,1) Ci. ii) a, •mond~d 29 U .. C. Seo. lS8 
(h) (4) (I, il ) . 
The gkkfltin;: acriv.it:r """''a.9 prc11u.ma.bly an. au.cmpr 
by tho un-lou l o t_cl!l the 1959 Amen.dm.cn t., tao 
t.he Act or 1947. The Cotlrt so.id: ''Con;r-~!:!s., 
whea h enac ted the 1959 .. -\rnen.dmcllt:9- to the 
No.tional Wor Rcluione J\Q"tl' .made -jl fun.dn -
mcmtnl j Ltdgment u a pan of iu, bu.le 1.ihor 
poUo)·; i1 d.eter.mihed th-.:tt , •• i t. wns u.ndeili.-
llhlt fJ>r primnry ompl.oycn, ro he , ubj ecled to 
cyclonic er.onomfo press-urcs through loss of 
hus:b:1636 brnu;.li t abou.t through coaoive ac:tio.n.s 
d irected b y a union tow3rd pers,;1n1 t:hrou&h 
·whom one'! goods Ell'& ,old or duttlbw.ed i tbc:i 
im_portfi.01 fncto-r iii the ttltimt=nt of uoer1cdon 
ag.uiDJJt the atu.lnlL 
"° 289 F .2d 591 (2d Cir. 1961). 
"' I d. o_t 595. 
e245 F .2d 585 {D.C. Cir. 1959). 
H ]U F .2d at 147, 
.. Id . ot 147-148~ 
41;/d. ~t 154. 
<Ill UnHc4 tefllworku.s oI America v. NLRB, 
&1- -.CL 899 (1964). 
<1 Jd. at oo.i. 
lege of Law .from 1935 to 1956. He 
was Vice-President from 1945 to 
1949, and Pil:esident from 1949 to 
1956. He was active in ,the merger 
which created William Mitchell and 
served as trustee and Vice-President 
until 1959 when he resigned froon 
this and other activities. The law 
lihrary at William Mitchell bears 
his name. 
It is sometimes said that there 
are people who know history, and 
those who make it. Judge Sanborn 
fits both ,categories. Born on No-
vember 9, 1883 he was named after 
his father, an illustrious Civil War 
General who commanded the 4th 
Minnesota Regiment at the Battle 
of Vicksburg. Judge Sanborn was 
called upon .by Governor Anderson 
to represent Minnesota in 1956 at 
a commemora,tion of a park near 
Vickshu:r,g honoring the memory of 
the men who gave their lives there. 
Certainly these thoughts must have 
crossed his mind on August 4, 1958 
when the full panel of 8th Circuit 
Judges were called upon to render 
the now famous "Little Rock" inte-
gration decisions. Nor w.as this the 
only historic event in which he 
had a participating hand. Following 
graduation from the St. Paul Col-
lege of Law in 1907 Judge Sanborn 
wias elected a member of the Minne-
sota House of Representatives in 
1913. T,his was ·the last legislative 
session to reapportion legislative dis-
tricts in the State of Minnesota. 
A lifelong Republican, Judge San-
·born was re-elected to the House in 
1915 and named State Insurance 
Commissioner in 1916. He resigned 
this position in 1918 to become a 
priva,te in the U. S. Army and re-
turned after a brief period of mili-
tary ,service to ,private practice in 
St. Paul. In 1922 he was appointed 
by Minnesota's Governor J. A. Preus 
to the position of District Court 
Judge with a simultaneous appoint-
ment to ,the Minnesota Tax Com-
mission. He left both positions in 
1925 to accept an appointment as 
Federal District Judge from Presi-
dent Calvin Coolidge and held thls 
position until 1932 when he was 
appointed to .the Circuit Court of 
Appeals for the 8th District by 
President Herbert Hoover. 
In 1959 Judge Sanborn received 
an honorary Doctor of Lawis from 
W~lliam Mitchell and rbhe honors of 
his colleagues as reported in 44 Min-
nesota Law Review, December 1959. 
This article, .by the Right Honor-
able Gunnar H. Nordbye and Mr. 
Justice Charles E. Whittaker, re-
veals that like most good jurists, 
Judge Sanborn was held in personal 
as well as legal esteem. Those who 
knew him pointed to his quiet wit, 
sense of humor, personal dignity 
and modesty. He was well-liked, 
friendly, and courteou,s. Justice 
Whittaker referred to rum as the 
equal of any of the great judges 
who graced the 8th Circuit, includ-
ing "·his brilliant cousin Walter San-
born, the scholarly Van V aJkenberg, 
the keen Kenyon, and the i!:edoubt-
able Riddick." As a jurist he was 
always courageous in his declara-
tion of the law whether it was porpu-
1ar or not, and "his disdain for dis-
play, particularly of erudition, has 
not only been slyly articulated, but 
is subtly evident in nearly all of 
his opinions." He was always clear 
and concise. Essentially a juxistic 
conservative, he did not believe the 
trial coul"ts ,should be overturned at 
every slight, nor that precedent 
should be ignored. 
Listed in Who's Who in America 
for many year,s, Judge Sanborn was 
,also a member of the American 
Legion, Loyal Legion, and Chi Psi, 
by which he was given the Out-
standing Achievement Award for 
1959 by its successor iAlpha Nu, its 
-a.lumni and the University of Min-
nesota. 
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ALUMNI BRIEFS 
Grads Are Judges, Executives, International Lawyers 
by R. W . Rahn, Alumni Editor 1926 
Ca:IE_F JUSTICE Lu.•fES T. H .-'.R-
1912 R~ON i till ervin-g on the Montana 
J-crs:r1cE ALBERT H. A.1"GSTl\1A'N ' uprem Court. ,and wa kind 
passed away a t H le11a. :.Uontana OD enough to furni-h new of the l)ass-
Februa.rv -9, 1964. He "as fust ing of former Justice Angstman f-
elected · to the _:l\Ionlana up,reme tl1 at co art. 
Cour in 19" going on the bench 
the firt of the ,·ear in 1919. He re- 1934 
ignccl pril 10: 196 afte,r e.rving W.~n, l:l T. CmLD. cxecuti, e ,;ce 
for ovel' ~7 yc.1rs. longer tllfill any president of Great ~orthern Insur-
other ju tic on that court. He is ance ompany. 1iinneapoli · ha 
urvived hr hj widow France who bee11 . named _co-chairman of the 
resides iu Helena; a son Albert who l~owmg thcomNmit~ee lfo: the_ c~nven-r 
· tt '<l' , · DAn.,A~· a t.Jon of e at1onn. ..,, .. oc1at10n o 
1s an a, o.rney reSJ I.It" ill ~,. ...... · · b hel I 
daughter. 11r . Rayrnonu p te of ~~;~nc po1Co_m~n1J· ionerl9t6o' e c 
Billings, wlto i married to an at- m h..1.wnea is m une "'· 
torner and another daughter, l\.& . 1938 
Hild~nbrand who lives in algary, GEORGI:: L. We LER recently 
Alberta, Canada.. \Vrote rthe follo\,·ing to your alumni 
1921 ditor, which we deem "·orthy o:f 
C.illL F. RA..'1 - reproduction in full: 
nun. chairman of "Just received th J anuar. i. ue 
tbe hoard and chief of the Opini n. wl1icl1 I enj ciyecl 
e,'(ecutive officer o! re.u.<ling very much. 
Luth ran Br.other- ··r a.m accepting 1·01u· invitation 
liood Lile In · urance to write a bit irbout nl)" elf in. th 
Company, l\Iinne- h.opes tl1at ·ome oi m.v old clas. -
apoli , ~vii Tecen·t- mat wiJI be cncoura.ged to do 
1.v elected ,pTesident. <the same. ome of them mi.,.hl 
Granrud of the l\linne ota. eyen dsop me. a line! 
In u ran ce .Feder- "I gr-acluated from th old 1Iitl-
ation. He was also recently appointed neapoli Coll ere of La\Y in 1938. 
to the -pr ident' advi~ory c-o=it- Practiced la1<' in :i\,finneapo1is un-
tee ·of Luther Colleg at Decorah. ti! 19J.Q when I left to be<:ome a 
Iowa. field attorney ";tb t,b _ ational 
1,,\Tl'ON W. H.u.;n.ro::v i 1\1itJ1 Labor Relations Boa_rd in Balti-
Beecl1e La,\· Firm, Ltd .. engaging more. ?ltfaryland. I n 1950, I was 
primarily in peronaJ injury and t ransferred· to Puerto Rico as the 
COIJ)Oration work. He graduated Board regional attorney. " ·hich 
cwn Laude from William :Mitchell. position I held until I resigned in 
1923 1956 to practice law in an. Juan. 
Joa."s E . ,rR"n-:Ell and }!a.rvin Ja- .i\Iy la,w ipractice since then has 
cobSOD (class of 1961) are no"- in been d voted al.mo t exclu.sfrely to 
pa.rtner-hip a - ti·~·ker & Jacobson. labor-management problems. 
practicing patent and trad,emark .. Would you change m. lIU1i.ling 
law in the Fir t Katioual Bank a<ldr to Po t Offic Box 989 , 
Bwlding. t. Paul. He is a member - anturcc, Puerto Ric-o?" 
of the ta.te Bar Association. com- 1947 
mittee on 'J)a,tent tra,demark and .i\Lu1TlN L. TABL KE of bask.a, 
COpFjgbt la.w. Can-er County Attorney since 1950. 
1924 died Jw:ruan- 26 at aae ii2. Born in 
Sncm H. G:w- Hamburg, :Th!inne. ota in 191"', l,e 
FORD, 6:2, ·who for graduated from the Universi ,y of 
t.he .past eight y~r 1.unnesota "·ith a B. . degree, and 
has . been. a vice practiced in ha.ska since graduation 
ip.res:idoot and ecr~- from law school. H e i,; rurvi\·ed by 
tary of Con oli - h.i ";re Audrny, ·on Cr.aig, dauahter 
dated Food Cor- Gretchen and three bi-others and 
pora.ti'on. Chicago. fh-e s.i ter . 
Gifford 
was elected to tJ1e 
:Board of Director 
in October 1963. 
Re i al o &e.nera.l coun.se1 of t liat 
c.-omipany. 
Born in _'\berdeen, outb Dakota 
iJl 1902, be wa a..:-ociat cl with rr, 
tark & Kidder in t. Pau] in 19@4, 
\,·hen he !!'radua ted from William 
Mitchell. He was hou counsel for 
Rei<l .i\fordock & Co .. Chica.go £rom 
l924 to 19SS; assistant ecretary and 
counsel trom I 9S to l 945: aIJd ec-
retary and genera,! counsel from 
1945 to 1946. From 19-16 to l95-, he 
was as. istant secret:Ary of Con·oli-
dat d GrOCl;"I Corporation. In 1953 
he went to Consolidated F d , 
wJ.:iere he w-a.- elected vice pre·iderrt 
in 1955. Re and hi "ife Marian live 
at 940 :Beaver Lane Glenview, Illi-
nois. He is commodore of the Pista-
Kee Yacht Club, McHenry, Illinois. 
1951 
RonERT J. BR.Et .-tG, 39, .ha bee11 
appointed Fi.rsl District judge. ·uc-
c ling Judge William . Chri fon-
son of Red \ ing, ty Mi:nne·ota 
Gov~rnor Karl Rolvaag. A. native of 
Jordan. ·Minnesota, .h attended. St. 
John's niversity at CQlle-geville and 
e.rv cl in th ~ -avy during World 
\"i ar U . .He _practic •d l,a\,. at Vlorth-
ington ::\Tumesota from 195,1 1:o 
l 95 and from 19,58 until now ha · 
been tpracti<:ing at Jordan. Re 
married and ha three children. 
1952 
v\'.Allli.E.· D. CH. llLSlsRL.UN , who 
ha.s been practicing in Faribault. 
Minnesota since 1954, ,]w enter d 
pa1·tnership with two other William 
'Mi-tchell !!l'adu,ates Raymond G . 
Wahlberg and Fra.nklm D. Peterson. 
Th firm has offi.c for the gen raJ 
SOLSS ·uu1w 1 1nod ·,s 
·aAlf ,1wwn5 OOLt 
M.D1 fO a6a110J 11a1p,1w WD!ll!M 
fO 
U0!,1Dt:)055lf .ID& ,1uapn,15 a1u 
practice of law in Kenyon ancl Fari-
bauJL. A native of Tracy, l\linne- ta., 
h:c: ~ttended Norbhern tate Tea.ch-
ers College a.t Aberdeen and ~far-
quette Diver ·t)· at ~Iilw,aukee. 
1953 
H..um, P. TROX(i of Kuepper . 
b'on" & Knepper spoke on ' ·To Ip--
corporate or ~ot to Incorporate. 
Tha t I th Question.' ' explC>ring .tax 
and othlT consequences. as . "·ell as 




ager of pa;tent and 
licens ing : en·ice · 




ince 1960. :ha, been 
Somermeyer appointed rt<> \ts-Sist 
the company'll< vice 
presiden t of patent and licen ing in 
Ne," York Citv . He is a member { 
the 11Iinne'ota · Patent La1v A ·soc:a-
tion and ,Ll1 In ·ti tut vf Electrical 
and Electronic E n!!ineer-s. 
titled "Legal D Cl'iption [ Ha,·e the .Minnesota Tru t Building. 
Known," roncernin.g legal descrip- ROBDRT T. WHITE. formerly with 
tion problems in abstract exam.in.a- ~ ley & Na:rveson, is with Murnane. 
tioD, at the 13th Annual Fall In ti- l\Iurnane. Batti , D Lambert u.1 
tute held. ovember 7. , l96S at the th.e Commerce B uilding, t. P aul , 
Leamington Hotel. 1\Iinne.-'l.poli~. He as 0£ April 6, 196-1'. 




:S.'E, 30, is pra ticin<r 
on hi· o"---u in the 
)tfinnesota Federal 
BuildiDg, Miune-
apoli . handling pri-
mru·ily p r ·oual in-
jury work. He is 
al o tate Repre-
1962 
Tuol'l.t.1 C. DILLON. a native of 
Faribault, i now a ociated with 
.John E . Coughlin in the practice of 
law al Faribault. D illon attended 
t. Thomas Coll ae. t. PauJ, and 
gra I uatecl from he niversi ty of 
) linnesota. 
Flakne 
s eu ta tive for the 
Fifth Congressional ' 
Di trict. 
Tuo;-,us J. ~IK-
OLAl, !31. a patent 
attorney w-i-Ut uj. 
vac Divi · ioD of 
pen~· Iland Cor-
pon1.tion, ha.s been 
api)ointed a. c ti 11 g 
manager of paterJt 
and licen,sin" serv-
ice · for T1vin Cities 
Ki;;).,_"ETI-£ 1\L CILU>.E · , formerly 
an it ociate o{ the fl= , ha been 
admitted to pitrtner hip with. Al t-
man. Geraghty & JHulally with of-
fices in the Degri e of Honor .Build-
ing, t. Paul. 
1961 
R -uuu: F. CHRJ TIA!\, formerly 
Nikolai 
operatio-1 of th 
1958 witl1 Ranson, Hazen & L)' llch in t. 
company. He received a degree in 
electrical engineering from the ni-
versity of Minnesota in 1956 . and 
,rn. an honor graduate of William 
.:.\li tc.he]l 
R..\l';:,,rOXJ> G. W .\_BLBERG of Ricl1- .Paul, has formed a partnership for 
field, .niinne ota has n ered J ru·t- the 0 ·~eral practic. f law "-ith 
ner hip with t11·0 other William W.illirun L . Heinen, Le uelll' Cou.n-
II.mow J . "· · WEE1' . 32., fonne,r-
ly gro up insura.nce contract approver 
wilh .Prudential liPurance Com-
Mitchell grad ua:te , \'Yarren D. ty A.Horney. 
pany. 1.Ii.nneapoli · has been a....<:so<.:i-
Chamberlain and Frnnklin D. Pet r-
_on. A Tniversity of llinn ota 
graduate in bl in ·s admin.i ·tration. 
he was foTmerly employed b)7 Elec-
tri<' llichinery ~'Ianufaclnring Com-
pan~' as an accoun t analy t; Wal-
dorf Pai>e.r om.pan)' ,a chief ac-
countant am! credit manager; and 
futerna tional HousiDg or.paration 
a head of th l gal and accounting 
depar tmen.t.s. 
1959 
ER:, - ,,. A... B EJEDL E of B dl L w 
Firm Ltd .. in th • nion Building in 
South t. Paul, is now s rving his 
tb.ird term a~ 'bite Repr.e entative 
for ·tihe 46th Legislative Di trict 
ouith (West sid of t . Paul ). He 
was elected to hi- fir t term while a 
student at William Mitchell. 
.J..\.:.\£F..S F. FINLEY is associa!led 
with R. Donald KeUy in the practice 
of luw m the Minnesota Building. 
t. Paul. He is a.l Rams County 
Court Commi sioner, and exe utiY 
ecreta.r.r of t he Transfer Men' As-
ociation of t. Paul, Inc. The new 
firm will coutinue the Ian· practice 
of the late Jo. eph ?IL Don-a.hue. 
las · of 38. 
Tr-1: ~us F. Mc-
CA..~,., 37, exe u,tiYe 
a.ss.istant in the in-
uran<:e la."'· depart--
men t of Lhe St. 
Paul Fi re and l\Ia-
r in e In •urance 
Compan y in 't. 
Paul. ha been 
elected a ' si - tant 
ecretary. Casual~-
ure~, Divi ion. He was also 
elected ma,yor of horeview li.inne-
sota in 1963. 
BRu EA. POUL!;F.,.-.: , attorney in the 
law department, Prudential Insur-
ance Company, fi.nneapoli . recent-
ly was promoted •to assi tao,t co1m l 
of that company. 
KE .NE'l'fi OTT. who i practic-
ing in Fa.innont, l\.[inn.esota, i tate 
Repre, entati\-e for Madi.Ji County. 
ALONZO B. ' IL.\.Y .i;; now -practic-
ing in general partnership with the 
finn of Mastor, Hart & Seran Roan-
oke Building, Minneapolis. 
CHARLES R . WAHLQUIST, who has 
!.ieen in general p ractice a.t Starbuck, 
:Minnesota since October 1963, has 
taken over the practice of the late 
William Merrill. He is a graduate 
of Hamline Univer,sity . 
CHARLES R. WEAVER, partner in 
the firm of Weaver, Ta.Ile & Her-
rick, with offices in Anoka and Frid-
ley, Minnesota, presented a talk en-
PETER F . FnEN- ate<l ince October ,vith Mordaunt. 
.IBB, 2.(), b came a - W-al ·ta.cl , Cousineau & 111:cGuir ~ 
si_ t~mt trea ure.r _of the Fir. t ~at:ionaJ Bank Building. 
rutcd Benefit Life ::.\Iinneapoli ·. A. native of Fairmont. 
In urance Com- :\unnesota vreet ·erved i11 the 
pany, the Lil'e .affili. CounterinteUigence Corp while in 
ate of ::\Iutual of th Army fr.om 195J. to 1956. 
Frenzer 
Omaha. on J.anuary 
0 7, 1964. He joined 
the company in 
196'! a.;; an invest-
ment aualyst, afteT working £or Pru-
neapolis. Frerm!r ·ecPivP<l a B .C. 
degre from reighton niversi.ty 
airnww. cwn l.aude in 1956, and was 
grnduated cwn laude from William 
Mitchell in 1961. He i admitted to 
practice iu .niinnesota and Nebras-
ka. and before the federal cour ·. 
DAL!il J. R.u,pe, 31 forme,rly in 
the ordinary premium accounting cli-
vLs·on of Prudential Ill'urance Com-
pany, ha been with the B]oomina-
ton , it.'· Attorney' offic since June 
196e. H i~ UO-..Y Assistant City At • 
tomey. engaging primruily iin trial 
and appell-a te ~-ork. Happe hrnther 
Gene is urrently a third year stu-
dent at William :.\:I.itchell 
P .\.TR.I! K W. HAWKINS is with 
Beedle Law Firm, Ltd. . engaging 
primarily in dome~tic selations and 
ci:imina,l litw. 
MARYIN J ACOB o~ is now practic-
ing with J ohn E. - tryker (clas of 
10.1?3) a. ,tryker & Jacobson in the 
First National Bank Building, t. 
Paul. He- engages primarily in pat-
en and trademark Jaw. and i- a 
member of th tate Bar _A sqc_i-
ation comm ittee ou patent, trade-
mark and copyright law. 
:Ji.AR.LES A. JOHNSON, 28 patent 
attom y with Univac D ivision of 
'J)Cl"ry Rand orp<>ration. in t. 
Paul since 1961, joined the Albert 
Le.a. fitm of Peterson Peterson & 
Tuveson. La.;it yeru: Johnson c m-
ple-ted requirement for practice as 
a paten attorney before the nited 
State~ Patent Offic . 
FRANKLIN D. PETERSON, village 
attorney at Kenyon, Minnesota, has 
entered partnership wi,th t wo other 
William Mitchell graduates, Warren 
D. Chamberlain oand Raymond G . 
Wahlberg. A graduate of St. Cloud 
State College in ibusiness administra-
tion, he has practiced law in Kenyon 
for a year. 
KENNETH M. STROM, formerly 
with Peterson & Holtze, Minne-
a,polis, is now associated in the geD-
era,l praotice of law with Kermit 
Hoversten in Austin, Minnesota, in 
1963 
:S:£R.13ERT .:.\'[. A.ORTA.~ i now a reg-
; te.re<l p1Hent ,attorney. working 
1dth the Hooker Chemical Corpora-
tion, Nia ara Fal]s, New York. 
ROBERT F . BEnmm has become a 
partner in the 6..rro of O'Leary, 
Tre.nti & B rg·r at T ircin.ia Minne-
sota. A 11ati,·e of wginia, he grad-
uated from William l\IitcheJJ cu.111 
la ude. He was with the United 
tate Fidelit~, and Guarruity Com-
pany for four years. 
Lam· J . CULLIGAN. 30. is now in 
the textbook departm nt at. West 
Pubushino Company in t. Paul. 
H wa~ forme,rly with the man u-
. c_rjpL department. 
Joyc:e 
1\tfaRTu'< J_ J OYCE. 
28. ha been ,as oci-
ated with a.nboi:n . 
,Jackson & Rice in 
the gen ral practice 
of law 'in the Endi-
cott Building, 't. 
P,aul since Decem-
ber !-2. l96S. (l\lr. 
Ri,ce of th.at firm 
teache. C o-n t,i tu -
tional La,w II t William Mitchell.) On 
January l :i, 1964 Joye wa ap-
pointed 'J)ecial Municipal J udrre of 
2\faplewood , adnai" Heights and 
LitUe Canada. 1\1iruie ota by Min-
nesota Governor Karl Rolvaag. 
ROBERT ONEILL of. t. P aul i. 
now a. parb1er of Clayton Nelson. 
p-rnct.icing in Kew Pi-a,,<rtJe. 1ifume-
sota. He bold a J3. . degree from 
Wi con;iin State Colfoge at Rh-er 
Fails. O'Neill is mOYing to New 
Prague t1u- pri11g \Vith his wif . 
JOUN l\1 . m beca-me an associ-
ate with Robbins, Davis & Lyons, 
Minnea,po1is, on March I, 1964. 
WAYNE A. VAN-
DER VoRT, 27, for-
merly with the trust 
department of the 
First National Bank 
of Minneapolis, ibe-
c am e asso ciated 
with Warner , Ra-
telle & Hennessy in 
Vander Vort the general practi<:e 
of law on March l , 
1964. Offices are in the Rand Tower, 
Minneapolis . 
